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Introduction 
 
At the beginning of the American Civil War (1861 – 1865), the North and South were locked in 
a stalemate. The military strength of both sides could be considered roughly the same, and on 
the battlefield, neither side could present a significant advantage over the other. Both sides raised 
vast armies and armed their soldiers with the rifled-musket, giving them increased firepower. In 
addition, the Union and Confederate soldiers shared the same military traditions, were trained in 
the same infantry tactics, and had either no combat experience or shared the same experience in 
federal service. The military capability of the Union and Confederate armies was therefore as 
similar as it was limited.2 
The large scale and advanced weaponry presented opportunities as well as challenges. On 
the battlefield, commanding officers had to solve these ‘tactical problems’. The tactical insight of 
one officer, expressed by his ability and willingness to make effective use of those under his 
command, could mean the difference between victory and defeat. Therefore, on the battlefields 
of the Civil War, where both North and South were able to match each other’s military capacity, 
effective military command was pivotal. Still, how did an officer acquire the tactical insight to 
turn the tide of battle in his favour? Was it forged from the bottom up through the experience of 
combat, or did it descend from the top down revealed by the study of tactics? Hence the thesis 
question: What was the theoretical knowledge of warfare of the American commanding officer, how did he apply 
this knowledge on the battlefield and to what extent did he adjust these ideas during the course of the American 
Civil War? 
The American Civil War has been (and still is) closely examined by the academic 
community, covering a wide range of subjects. The military history of the Civil War has 
dominated popular interest, most vividly expressed by the re-enactment of its battles. Although 
academic interest for the military history remains high, it is neither dominant nor confined.3 
While daunting at first and perhaps no longer susceptible to ground breaking revelations, there is 
still room left for further analysis of how the Civil War unfolded on the American battlefields. 
Regarding the subject of Civil War tactics (which attends to these questions), historians James M. 
McPherson and William J. Jr. Cooper comment: ‘In the area of tactics, numerous single-battle narratives 
and several accounts of soldier motivation and combat experience have offered fragmentary snapshots, but we lack a 
                                                          
2 Hsieh, Wayne. The Old Army in War and Peace: West Pointers and the Civil War Era, 1814-1865. Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia, 2004: 23. 
3 McPherson, James M. and Cooper, William J. Jr. Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand. Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1998: 2-3. 
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systematic analysis of Civil War tactics that integrates such factors as technology, terrain, weather, and leadership 
and traces tactical evolutions over four years of conflict.’4 
A systematic analysis of Civil War tactics, as proposed by McPherson and Cooper, is 
therefore the starting point to answer the thesis question. Despite that the historiography of Civil 
War tactics is not extensive, it is not as incomplete as McPherson and Cooper suggest. The 
works Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage (1982) by Grady 
McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare (1988) 
by Edward Hagerman, Battle Tactics of the Civil War (1989) by Paddy Griffith and finally West 
Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army in War and Peace (2004) by Wayne Hsieh, all provide 
complete analyses of Civil War tactics.  
The difficulty, however, is that in search for confirmation of their own theories, these 
authors all shed a different light on the evolution of Civil War tactics. As a consequence, the 
‘diffused light’ shed on the subject, has somewhat obscured the historiographical direction of 
this field. Therefore, this thesis will restore clarity to the questions of how and why infantry 
tactics were employed over the course of the Civil War. To achieve this, earlier and more recent 
studies on the subject are examined, further substantiated by the survey of four significant battles 
in the Civil War. An answer to the thesis question will be based on the findings from the four 
battles, and the corresponding findings of the five aforementioned authors. 
 
The answer to the thesis question is formulated over two parts. The first part will handle the 
theoretical aspect of infantry tactics and will reconstruct the origins, transfer and adoption of a 
tactical doctrine by the U.S. Army until the outbreak of the American Civil War. Early-
nineteenth century American infantry tactics originated from France, and this transfer of 
knowledge was further encouraged by the United States Military Academy established in 1802. 
After the War of 1812, the formation of a small professional U.S. Army went hand-in-hand with 
the adoption of a standardised tactical doctrine. 
However, the reforms set in motion by the military were met with political and public 
resentment. The American martial society still held a high regard for the independent citizen-
soldier (or irregular) and had an overall adversity towards strong federal institutions. It was 
during the Mexican-American War that the U.S. Army could finally proof the value of 
professional soldiers (or regulars) and a standardised tactical doctrine. After the Mexican-
American War, advancements in musket technology prompted adjustments to the existing 
infantry doctrine; these were the last significant revisions to the doctrine before the outbreak of 
                                                          
4 McPherson and Cooper, Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand: 5. 
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the American Civil War. Finally, part one will turn to the build-up of the Union and Confederate 
armies during the early stages of the secession. As both sides quickly raised vast irregular armies, 
limitations of the existing tactical doctrine became apparent. The existing doctrine was developed 
to accommodate a small professional army and not vast and irregular armies. Drill-training 
constituted for many inexperienced soldiers and officers, the only form of preparation for 
combat. 
The second part of this thesis will handle the practical aspect of infantry tactics, turning 
to the question how the tactical doctrine came into practice on the battlefield and more 
importantly if it evolved over the course of the war. Four battles on the eastern theatre will be 
examined during different stages of the Civil War: the First Battle of Bull Run or Manassas, the 
Battle of Antietam or Sharpsburg, the Battle of Gettysburg and the Battle of Spotsylvania 
Courthouse. The North and South entitled battles differently; the Union would name the battle 
after the nearest body of water, while the Confederacy would name it after the nearest town. 
This thesis will use the Union titles (since history is ultimately written by victors). The terrain of 
these four battles was mostly the same, sparsely populated with rolling grasslands, small streams 
and partial high grounds from which the battlefield could be dominated. While the first three 
battles took place in lightly wooded areas; only the last battle at Spotsylvania Courthouse was in a 
heavily wooded area. 
While the strategic objectives and consequences will be briefly addressed, the thesis is 
centred on the tactical level of warfare, from the point in time that two opposing armies are 
positioned on the battlefield and engage each other. As the strategic circumstances of these four 
battles changed over the course of the war, only those influential on a tactical level will be taken 
into consideration. Furthermore, the thesis question is centred on the commanding officer; it is 
therefore important to remember that some tactical decisions were made with certain strategic 
objectives in mind. The first concern of an officer was the course of the battle, but on the 
battlefield the course of the war was always taken into consideration.  
The ability to adapt to the course of the war was invaluable, on the tactical level as well as 
the strategic level. During a war it could be extremely difficult to adjust the established 
theoretical framework (or tactical doctrine) to the nature of warfare. The influential military 
theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780 – 1831) formulated the concept of war as follows: ‘War 
therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.’5 Unquestionably the Civil 
War does not challenge this concept of war (nor did any war before and after). While the 
concept of war has remained the same, the act of war itself has not. Warfare has been susceptible 
                                                          
5 Clausewitz von, Carl IN Graham, J.J. (editor) On War. London: N. Trübner, 1873: 22. 
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to inevitable change driven by technological progress. The evolution of warfare has provided us 
with new ways ‘to compel our opponent to fulfil our will’. The ability to adapt to this inevitable 
change can therefore be decisive for a victory that achieves a state of peace. 
The 2009 Land Doctrine Publicatie of the Royal Netherlands Army provides the present-day 
Dutch army officer with a conceptual framework for ground warfare. The LDP states that 
success in war does not solely depend on the availability of military capacity, for it is worthless 
without the capability to use it. In other words, the available men and resources can only be 
useful if the ability and willingness exist to use them. Military capability consists of three 
components: the conceptual, physical and mental.  
The conceptual component comprises the doctrine, a set of common principles on 
warfare, tactics and procedures which translate military theory into practice. The physical 
component comprises the available operational resources of men and material, the soldier and 
his weapon. The mental component comprises the qualities of effective leadership, which is a 
well-organised use of resources, perception and the intrinsic motivation to function in a combat 
situation.6 The LDP provides a framework for these variables converging on the lowest level of 
warfare, the tactical level. The tactical level of warfare remains very elusive, even with the 
present-day theoretical knowledge of the LDP.  
The convergence of the theory and practice of warfare on the battlefield was also 
considered problematic by the theorists of the nineteenth century. The German military theorist 
Helmuth von Moltke (1800 – 1891) summarised it as follows: ‘No plan of operations extends with 
certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy’s main strength.’7 The Swiss military theorist Antoine-
Henri Jomini (1779 – 1869), however, was convinced that to a certain extent, warfare could be 
moulded into a system of fixed laws. Jomini divided the act of war into one political and five 
military levels. The highest level of warfare is political: ‘statesmanship in its relation to war’ or 
diplomacy. Thereafter follows the highest military level: ‘strategy or the art of properly directing masses 
upon the theatre of war, either for defence or invasion.’ Then there are ‘grand tactics and logistics or the art of 
moving armies,’ followed by ‘engineering or the attack or defence of fortifications,’ and finally ‘minor tactics.’8 
                                                          
6 Brocades Zaalberg, T.W., Cate ten, A., van Gils, R.J.A., Hagemeijer, W.J. and Mulder, M.J.A. Land Doctrine 
Publicatie: Militaire Doctrine voor het Land Optreden. Amersfoort: Opleidings- en Trainingscentrum Operatiën, 2009: 106. 
7 Moltke von, Helmuth IN Hughes, Daniel J. (editor). Moltke on the Art of War: selected writings. New York: Presidio 
Press, 1993: 45.  
See Clausewitz von, On War: 75. Von Moltke’s statement is based on the concept of friction by Clausewitz: 
‘Everything is very simple in War, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man 
can imagine exactly who has not seen War’ and ‘Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to that which 
distinguishes real War from War on paper.’  
8 Jomini, Antoine-Henri IN Mendell, G.H. and Craighill, W.P. (editors). Summary on the Principles of the Art of War. 
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862: 13. 
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Jomini concluded: ‘War in its ensemble is not a science, but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be 
regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of war viewed as a whole.’9 
The susceptibility to fixed laws therefore depends on the level of warfare. On the lowest 
level of warfare, the tactical level, Jomini recognises that: ‘combats may be mentioned as often being 
quite independent of scientific combinations, and they may become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and 
inspirations and a thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements.’ Furthermore, ‘The passions 
which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, the warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent 
of their commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations and epochs, –  in a word, everything that can be 
called the poetry and metaphysics of war, – will have a permanent influence on its results’.10 This does not 
mean that Jomini disregards the application of any fixed laws on the tactical level; however, the 
application thereof can no longer ensure the same predicted outcome as on the strategic level.  
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Army in War and Peace (2004) by Wayne Hsieh.  
In Attack and Die, Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson argue that, during the Civil 
War, the rifled-musket greatly favoured the defender. While the Union military adjusted their 
tactics to exploit the superiority of the defensive position, the Confederates did not. The 
Confederate command persisted in using early-nineteenth century assault tactics, resulting in 
higher losses and consequently an inability to sustain the war effort against the North. The 
                                                          
9 Jomini, Summary on the Principles of the Art of War: 321. 
10 Ibid. 
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authors attribute the compulsive use of offensive tactics to the Celtic origins of Southern culture, 
which inclined them to fight aggressively.11 Historian Joseph T. Glatthaar comments that their 
findings: ‘caused a firestorm of debate which, unfortunately, has camouflaged the great contributions of the 
book’12and points out that: ‘McWhiney and Jamieson provide us with the best survey of American tactical 
thought from the Napoleonic era until into the Civil War.’13 
The work of Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern War 
follows the same line of thought as McWhiney and Jamieson with regard to the significant 
influence of the rifled-musket on infantry tactics in the Civil War. These advancements incited an 
increased use of defensive tactics (expressed by the use of field fortifications) already advocated 
by the American military theorist Dennis Hart Mahan before the Civil War.14 Hagerman suggests 
that the American Civil War carried the characteristics of trench warfare also witnessed in the 
First World War. In contrast to McWhiney and Jamieson, Hagerman perceives a dominance of 
the tactical defensive on the side of the Union as well as the Confederacy. Therefore, he defines 
the Civil War as the first modern war.15 
Historian Paddy Griffith, however, contends the significant impact of the rifled-musket 
altogether. In his work Battle Tactics of the Civil War, Griffith argues that the American Civil War 
showed more characteristics of the Napoleonic Wars than of any early-twentieth century war. 
The need to employ field fortifications, he argues, was tactically not different than during the 
Napoleonic Wars. The theoretical advocacy of the tactical defensive needlessly extended the 
conflict, which otherwise would have seen more decisive battles as seen in the Napoleonic era. 
The failure of early-nineteenth century assault tactics was not the result of the increased 
firepower. It was rather the ignorance of commanding officers for the incompatibility of their 
soldiers with early-nineteenth century tactics.16 
The dissertation of Wayne Hsieh West Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army in War and 
Peace acknowledges Griffith’s claims to a certain extent. According to Hsieh, neither side could 
present a significant advantage over the other and therefore the individual ‘military expertise’ of 
commanding officers was far more influential than the emergence of the rifled-musket and use 
of field fortifications. The author also points regularly to the influence of the American national 
identity on the military, from a perceived difference between the American and European 
                                                          
11 McWhiney, Grady and Jamieson, Perry D. Attack and Die Civil War Military tactics and the southern heritage. 
Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1982: 172-173. 
12 Glatthaar, Joseph T. IN McPherson and Cooper, Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand: 67-68. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Hagerman, Edward. The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1988:  293. 
15 Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: 9. 
16 Griffith, Paddy. Battle Tactics of the Civil War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989: 189-192. 
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terrain, to the unwillingness to tolerate an American military establishment which imposed 
stricter control on the free-spirited mind of the American civilian.17 
The views of these five authors on the evolution of infantry tactics in the Civil War will 
be examined in combination with the findings from the four battles. After the description of 
each battle, the tactics used by both sides will be briefly discussed. The final chapter will examine 
the views of the five authors compared to the findings with regard to the employed tactics in all 
four battles. The decisive role of the commanding officers, the infantry doctrine, field 
fortifications and the rifled-musket will be reviewed. 
The descriptive parts of this thesis relied mostly on the following three works: Battle Cry 
of Freedom: The Civil War Era (1988) by James M. McPherson, The Longest Night: Military History of 
the Civil War (2001) by David J. Eicher and The American Civil War: A Military History by (2009) 
John Keegan. These works are most referred to with regard to the description of the four battles, 
dealing with the strategic background, opposing forces and battlefield terrain.  
The first-hand accounts referred to are the army regulations, drill instructions and tactical 
manuals prescribed in the U.S. Army from 1815 to the Civil War. The comprised army 
regulations, drill-instructions and tactical manuals are the theoretical framework on which the 
tactical doctrine of the Union and Confederate military was built. Still, the success and 
importance of the established theoretical framework mainly depended on how it came into 
practice and, even more importantly, whether it came into practice at all.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Hsieh, The Old Army in War and Peace: ii. 
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Part One 
The American Infantry Doctrine  
1812 – 1861 
 
‘The only really practical man is one who is thoroughly grounded in theory.’18 
 
Chapter 1 The American infantry doctrine 1812 – 1846 
 
1.1 The origins and transfer of nineteenth century infantry tactics 
The infantry tactics which the American officer could refer to during the Civil War originated 
from France. The academic community is clear on the French origins of the conceptual 
foundation of nineteenth century American infantry tactics. According to Edward Hagerman: 
‘American tactical and strategic thinking in the early and mid-nineteenth century largely followed the French 
lead.’19 In the same line of thought Paddy Griffith comments: ‘There is no avoiding the fact that 
American military institutions before the Civil War were moulded most profoundly by the military theories of the 
French’, boldly adding: ‘and it is therefore the French who take a major part of the blame for the military 
disaster.’20 Griffith’s last comment is arguably a cynical exaggeration of the French influence on 
the nature of the American Civil War.  
The views of one military theorist, the Swiss21 Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779 –1869) were 
long regarded to be dominant during the first half of the nineteenth century. Griffith 
characterises Jomini as follows: ‘It is Bonaparte the renegade Corsican and Jomini the renegade Swiss who 
are generally supposed to have written most of the books which shaped the battles.’22 In 1838 Jomini published 
his renowned work Précis de l'Art de la Guerre: Des Principales Combinaisons de la Stratégie, de la Grande 
Tactiqueet de la Politique Militaire or The Art of War.23 In his work Jomini differentiates between 
strategy: ‘the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the theatre of 
war’24 and tactics: ‘the art of making them [the greatest part of the forces of an army] act at the decisive 
moment and the decisive point of the field of battle.’25 
                                                          
18 Mahan, Frederick Augustus IN Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: 8. 
19 Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: 5. 
20 Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War: 22. 
21 See Reardon, With a Sword in one Hand & Jomini in the other. The problem of military thought in the civil war north: 1-2. 
Jomini wrote his first work Traité des Gandes Operations Militaires under the patronage of the French Marshal Michel 
Ney, and later served on the personal staff of Napoleon during his campaigns of 1805.  
22 Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War: 22. 
23 Reardon, Carol. With a Sword in one Hand & Jomini in the other. The problem of military thought in the civil war north. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012: 3. 
24 Jomini, Summary on the Principles of the Art of War: 322. 
25 Ibid. 
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A general should therefore be: ‘at once a good tactician and strategist’26  to win a decisive 
victory on the battlefield. However, Jomini adds: ‘A general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, 
but not possessed of military coup-d'œil, coolness, and skill, may make an excellent strategic plan and be entirely 
unable to apply the rules of tactics in presence of an enemy.’ 27  Even if a general does possess the 
aforementioned traits: ‘No system of tactics can lead to victory when the morale of an army is bad; and even 
when it may be excellent, the victory may depend upon some occurrence’.28 Jomini acknowledges that his 
theories cannot teach a general what to do in every possible situation; he rather points out which 
errors a general should avoid. Still, in the end, Jomini argues that his theories grant ‘an almost 
certain victory in the hands of a skilful general commanding brave troops.’29 
Historian Carol Reardon points out that: ‘He [Jomini] always believed that the unique 
circumstances of a situation and the commanding general’s genius and skill would determine the most appropriate 
response.’30 McWhiney and Jamieson describe this sentiment as follows: ‘Military theorists before the 
Civil War stressed the tactical offensive and favoured close-order musket and bayonet tactics, but they often 
generalized their principles and shaded their advice with exceptional cases. Jomini sometimes qualified a main idea 
with a list of exceptions.’31 Reardon argues that Jomini describes in great detail how to prepare for 
war, but not how to fight it.32 
Jomini’s theories were primarily aimed at ‘the art of making war upon the map’33. Once two 
opposing armies were engaged on the battlefield (the tactical level of warfare), Jomini refrains 
from outlining a step by step approach.34 For that, he turns to more general principles of warfare 
like: ‘throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the 
first importance to overthrow’ and ‘they [the forces] shall engage at the proper times and with energy.’35 
While Jomini was not unaware of more complex tactical manoeuvres besides the direct 
and concentrated tactical approach, he considered them, such as the envelopment of enemy 
forces, hard to successfully execute.36 The attacking general would move his forces against the 
left and right flank of the enemy, which would endanger his centre and grant the enemy the 
opportunity to counterattack and split the attacking forces through the centre. Jomini remarks, 
                                                          
26 Jomini, Summary on the Principles of the Art of War: 322. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid: 323. 
29 Ibid. 
30  Reardon, With a Sword in one Hand & Jomini in the other: 5. 
31 McWhiney and Jamieson, Attack and Die: 46. 
32 Reardon, With a Sword in one Hand & Jomini in the other: 5. 
33 Jomini, Summary on the Principles of the Art of War: 69. 
34 Reardon, With a Sword in one Hand & Jomini in the other: 5. 
35 Jomini, Summary on the Principles of the Art of War: 70. 
36 Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: 4. 
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‘any movement is dangerous which is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking place, of 
beating the remainder of the army in position.’37 
Only a commander like Napoleon Bonaparte possessed the resolve to execute such 
manoeuvres successfully, notwithstanding that even Napoleon had seen battles38 which made the 
concentrated direct tactical confrontation more desirable. Hagerman therefore concludes, that 
Jomini under normal circumstances advised the less exceptional commander to rely on ‘the less 
desirable but more dependable –direct and concentrated strategic approach on interior lines.’39 This strategic 
approach, ultimately translated on the battlefield in a massed frontal assault against the weakest 
point in the enemy’s line, was a less desirable tactical approach because it would almost certainly 
end in high loss of life.40 
American military historians have long regarded Jomini’s views to be leading during the 
first half of the nineteenth century. Therefore, they naturally assumed that the generation of 
American officers who served during the Civil War, were also directly influenced by Jomini’s 
views. 41  The English translation of Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, was certainly available to the 
American officers to study.42 However, Reardon argues that Jomini’s influence on the theoretical 
knowledge of the American officer was not that significant. There is, for example, little reference 
to Jomini in any genre of Civil War literature, nor is there any detailed analysis of his principles.43 
Furthermore, Jomini’s views were already, in some form or the other, present in the existing 
European military literature. Therefore, Reardon concludes that Jomini: ‘represents a single – though 
admittedly strong – voice among a mass of military authors whose ideas became available to the Civil War 
generation.’44 
Reardon also question’s Jomini’s influence because the Civil War saw lively public 
debates on the usefulness of military theories altogether. The rejection of the study of military 
theories was based on presumptions such as, ‘too impractical, too pedantic or simply incompatible with the 
common sense that lay at the base of American’s national character.’45 Although Reardon herself remains 
unsettled on the influence of Jomini’s views, she concludes that the experience of the Civil War 
                                                          
37 Jomini, Summary on the Principles of the Art of War: 204. 
38 See Jomini, Summary on the Principles of the Art of War: 205-206. Jomini describes the Battle of Austerlitz (2 
December 1805) as an example in which Napoleon relied on the direct tactical confrontation. 
39 Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: 4. 
40 Ibid. 
41 See Reardon, With a Sword in one Hand & Jomini in the other: 1 and 5. The foundation for the belief of Jomini’s 
influence on the American Civil War was laid by the American Brig. Gen. J.D. Hittle. 
42 See Eicher, John H. and Eicher, David J. Civil War high commands. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001: 55-56.  
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at least taught the Americans the value of an intellectual framework for the study of war, albeit 
one by American design, rather than European.46 
 Hagerman, on the other hand, argues that before the Civil War, the American military 
theorists had already chosen an intellectual path which slightly diverted from their post-
Napoleonic counterparts in Europe. Unlike their European counterparts, they were not 
burdened by decades of prolonged large scale conflicts to reflect upon. While theorists like 
Jomini were preoccupied with the codification of the lessons learned in the Napoleonic Wars 
(1803 – 1815), American theorists took a more original approach towards the existing (mainly 
European) military theory. And as Hagerman notes: ‘the generation of American military writers that 
began to emerge by the 1830s modified the French influence in response to peculiarly American circumstances, 
technological change, and the lessons of a number of indecisive wars’47. 
 Especially with regard to the ‘new orthodoxy’ of the direct and concentrated tactical 
approach, a generation of American theorists emerged from the 1830s, who criticised this new 
orthodoxy, most notably Dennis Hart Mahan. Although the massed frontal assault was not 
discarded by them, it carried flaws (such as the inevitable high loss of life), which provided them 
the starting point for the formulation of an American tactical doctrine not centred on the tactical 
offensive.48 Based on the superiority of the massed frontal assault, the tactical offensive could 
quickly turn into a positional stalemate. If technological advancements diminished the 
effectiveness of the massed frontal assault as a tactic, this would shift the balance in favour of 
the tactical defensive. A simplistic example is the emergence of the machinegun and subsequent 
trench warfare of the First World War. Hagerman argues that such a shift of balance in favour of 
the tactical defensive was also revealed during the Civil War.49 
While the early nineteenth century theoretical debate still mostly favoured the relative 
strength of the tactical offensive over the defensive, the importance of a strong tactical defensive 
was recognised much earlier. The French military theorist Simon François Gay de Vernon was 
the foremost authority on the tactical defensive and gave it a formal place in the French military 
doctrine. Vernon became professor at the prestigious École Polytechnique, officially established in 
1804 by Napoleon to educate the military elite in the science of war with an emphasis on civil 
engineering.50 In 1805 Napoleon ordered that Vernon’s work Traité Élémentaire d'art Militaireet de 
Fortification, be used as an official textbook at the École Polytechnique and the other French military 
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schools. In his work, Vernon stressed the importance of field fortifications, not only for armies 
in a defensive position, but also for armies on the offensive. Gay de Vernon represented an 
earlier generation of French military theorists whose views, according to Hagerman, were 
overshadowed by those of the post-Napoleonic generation. However, the American theorists of 
the 1830s valued the views of both generations equally.51 
 
The direct transfer of French (and European) military ideas to the United States began shortly 
after the War of 1812 (1812 – 1815). Unresolved tensions between the United States and their 
former coloniser, the British Empire, led to the War of 1812. The ragtag federal forces had to 
devote all their efforts to defeat the British expeditionary force. While the brief reappearance of 
the Redcoats on American soil ended in their demise, the conflict had revealed critical 
shortcomings in the organisational structure of the U.S. Army. To address these shortcomings, 
American officers were sent on official missions to obtain professional knowledge in Europe. 
One of those officers was Capt. Sylvanus Thayer (1785 –1872), a veteran of the War of 1812 and 
graduate of the USMA at West Point. Thayer was ordered to study military institutions and 
fortifications in France, England and Germany, and also to collect available ‘books, maps and 
instruments’52. 
Besides official missions, professional knowledge was also obtained on more informal 
visits to Europe. 53  In 1815, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott (1786 –1866) was sent by his 
government to Europe. Scott travelled for a year through Europe to recover from his injuries 
sustained in the War of 1812, and for his own professional development.54 As a senior officer 
and veteran of 1812, Scott personally had experienced the deficiencies of the American military. 
Thus, he conceived a new organisational standard for the U.S. Army. Between 1818 and 1821, 
Scott compiled the first standardised General Regulations for the Army, including regulations on 
infantry tactics for staff bureaus and the military academy. Scott did not ignore the existing 
American military practice, but he referred to the British army regulations and the French 
Législation Militaire as sources of inspiration.55 
The existing military practice was formed during the American Revolutionary War (1775 
– 1783), under influence of the Prussian baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben (1730 –1794). 
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Baron von Steuben was appointed Inspector in the Continental Army of Commander-in-Chief 
George Washington. In the winter encampment of Valley Forge, Von Steuben instructed the 
irregular troops (volunteers and militiamen) in marching, close-order formations and musket 
handling.56 He published his instructions in the drill-manual: Regulations for the Order and Discipline 
of the Troops of the United States or Blue Book. In 1779, the Continental Congress adopted Von 
Steuben’s work as the official drill instructions manual for the federal U.S. Army, which 
remained until 1812 when it was replaced by manuals based upon French systems of drill-
training.57 
 While Winfield Scott was concerned with the standardisation of army regulations, 
Sylvanus Thayer turned his attention to the reorganisation of the military academy at West Point. 
Appointed as Superintendent of the USMA (1817 – 1833), Thayer envisioned the academy as the 
breeding ground for (a generation of) American officers in command of a small professional U.S. 
Army. Thayer modelled the USMA after the military schools in France, for he considered the 
French ‘as the sole repository of military science.’ 58  The education at West Point emphasised civil 
engineering; this academic approach was grounded in the French desire to integrate the military 
into civil society.59 The work of Gay de Vernon, Traité Élémentaire d'art Militaireet de Fortification 
was translated for use as a textbook at the academy and also served as the theoretical foundation 
for American field manuals until 1830.60 
 Direct French influence on the USMA came in the person of Benoit Claudius Crozet, 
alumnus of the École Polytechnique. Crozet was a professor in engineering and one of three 
Frenchmen among the seven faculty board members at West Point.61 Crozet was involved in the 
establishment of the engineering department and after he resigned from the USMA, he would 
play an important role in the founding of the Virginia Military Institute in 1839. The VMI 
established itself as the most prominent state military school and was of great importance for the 
training of Confederate cadets during the Civil War.62 
 
The two decades following after the War of 1812 were according to Hsieh: ‘crucial formative years’63 
for the American military. Supported by the Secretary of War John C. Calhoun (1782 –1850), the 
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senior officers and veterans of 1812 ensued on a mission to lift the U.S. Army to the 
professional standard of its European counterparts. Despite that Hsieh perceived ‘a certain awe for 
the epic sweep of the Napoleonic Wars’64, the French influence on the reforms of the U.S. Army was 
not ubiquitous on all organisational levels. The organisational structure and bureaucratic bodies 
of the army showed clear British influences. Still, the focal point of this thesis, the American 
infantry doctrine, was modelled after French example. The undeniable French influence on the 
American infantry doctrine, found its origins in the Franco-American alliance during the 
American Revolutionary War and was further amplified by the Napoleonic military legacy of the 
early-nineteenth century.65 
 
 
1.2 The adoption of a nineteenth century infantry tactics 
During the War of 1812, the American infantry doctrine still rested on the Blue Book from 1779.66 
Among others, already as a Congressman, Calhoun raised this issue in 1814, and in response the 
army commissioned a Board of Tactics after French example. On February 25 1815, the Board 
commissioned the adoption of the famous 1791 French manual for infantry tactics, Rules and 
Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manoeuvres of the French Infantry, translated by the British officer 
John Macdonald.67 
The Board adjusted the manual to the existing American military practice by revising the 
French infantry tactics regarding the line formation and movement rates. These basic drill 
instructions were of utmost importance on the battle field as soldiers had to march at a specific 
rate of steps-a-minute to maintain their formation. Only as a cohesive fighting force, could 
infantry men attack and defend effectively and withstand the harsh reality of nineteenth century 
battlefields, such as thick white gunpowder smoke, the crackling sound of musket fire, exploding 
artillery shells and the shock of a cavalry charge.   
In the basic line formation, soldiers had to stand and march facing the enemy in a file 
with single columns of soldiers standing in front of each other, several ranks deep and lines of 
soldiers standing side by side.  The number of files is the measure of the width and the number 
of ranks is the measure of the depth of a troop formation. The Board adopted the thin two-rank 
line formation,68 at the time it was a bold innovative reform as common practice dictated that a 
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line formation should be three ranks deep. In comparison, the French did not adopt a partial 
two-rank line formation in their regulations until 1831. 69  The American military was less 
grounded in longstanding military dogmas such as line formations of more than two ranks. 
Moreover, the two-rank formation served the practical limitations of the small U.S. Army. 
When soldiers in a line formation had fired their muskets, they reloaded while the rank 
behind them fired. Under fire, the casualties of the first two ranks were replaced by the men in 
the third rank. While a three-rank line formation could endure hails of enemy fire longer and was 
more resilient to cavalry charges, their effective firepower was equal to a two-rank formation. A 
small band of regulars, like the U.S. Army, could thereby match the frontal firepower of a three-
rank line formation.70 
Another basic formation was the column formation; this formation presented a small 
frontage (or fewer files) and therefore could not present the same firepower as a line formation. 
However the small frontage served another purpose, namely manoeuvrability; the turning radius 
of a column formation was much smaller than a line formation. Troops marched in a column 
unto the battlefield before deploying into the line formation and unleashing their firepower. In 
short, the column was the formation for manoeuvre, especially over difficult terrain.71 
The column formation was also employed as a shock tactic ‘intended to throw maximum force 
for penetration against a narrow front.’72 Attacks in line formations relied on firepower and attacks in 
column formations relied on shock tactics and the bayonet. The Board prescribed that a 
battalion would form a double attack column of two files, four companies deep and, in practice, 
the size of column formations would vary in time. In general, it was discouraged to only use a 
single formation; Jomini advocated the use of columns in combination with line formations.73 
The Board revised the French practice regarding the movement rates as soldiers were 
trained to march at specific rates depending on the combat situation. The standard movement 
rate was common-time, while quick-time and double quick-time were employed to bring the 
troops quickly in a position to close in and fire on the enemy. The Board adopted regulations 
which at the time imposed significantly higher movement rates than the existing French 
practice.74 It remains speculative, but Hsieh suggests that the faster movements could reflect: ‘a 
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perceived American need to move faster and more flexibly on the broken terrain of American battlefields.’75 The 
difference between the terrain of the (East Coast) American battlefields and European 
battlefields could not have been immense. After all, three out of four described battles in this 
thesis took place on open terrain, not much different from battlefields found in nineteenth 
century Europe (think for example of Waterloo). Therefore the exact reasoning behind the faster 
movement rates, prescribed by the Board, is hard to ascertain.  
Still, Keegan’s description of early-nineteenth century America could give us a 
suggestion, why the Board prescribed faster movement rates. Large parts of the East Coast of 
America were still heavily wooded, at least large enough to fuel the American industry (which in 
all honesty also could say something about the size of the American industry that time). While in 
Europe on the other hand forests had been cut down, so to fuel the industry the transition from 
wood to coal was made.76 So perhaps the Board considered the American terrain more difficult 
to traverse, because of the presence of still heavily wooded areas. Furthermore, in Europe one 
could rely on a network of roads long established before the Americas were even discovered. 
Finally, the most common enemy of the U.S. Army were still the native-Americans, who mostly 
consisted of lightly armed irregular troops. Yet another distinct circumstance, the Board had to 
take into consideration when they prescribed faster movement rates. 
The development of even swifter and more open order American infantry tactics 
ultimately led to the adoption of the 1825 Infantry Tactics: or, Rules for the Exercise and Manoeuvres of 
the Infantry of the U.S. Army.77 The 1825 infantry manual had an increased emphasis on light 
infantry tactics and the Board ordered the Commandant of Cadets William J. Worth to conduct 
field trials of the proposed light infantry drill with the cadets at West Point.78 
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Table 179 
Movement 
rates at 
steps-a -
minute 
Blue 
Book80 
French 
179181 
American 
181582 
American 
182583 
American 
183584 
Hardee 
186085 
Common-
time 
75 
76 
pas 
ordinaire 
90 90 90 90 
Quick-
time 
120 
100 
pas de 
charge 
120 120 110 110 
Double 
quick-time 
– 
120 
pas 
accélérée 
150 160 140 
165 
under specific 
circumstances 
180 
 
During the Civil War both sides adopted the work Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics for the Exercise and 
Manoeuvres of Troops When Acting as Light Infantry or Riflemen as the standard tactical manual for 
light- and line infantry, published in 1855 by Lt. Col. William J. Hardee (1815 – 1873). European 
practice dictated that light infantry employed more conspicuous tactics on the battlefield, and 
unlike line infantry, light infantry men used individual aimed fire-at-will whilst moving in open-
order formations (or clouds) in front of the line infantry or on the flanks. In addition, they were 
drilled to present their enemy with significant smaller targets by using the terrain for cover and 
firing from kneeled or prone positions.86 
Line-infantry fired a musket-volley on command and advanced (or retreated) shoulder to 
shoulder in close-order formations. Armed with the bayonet for melee fighting, soldiers in a 
close-order formation were more resilient to cavalry charges and were ideally in a squared 
formation to fend off a cavalry charge from all directions. The light infantry did not employ such 
formations; their muskets did not yet grant them the fire-rate nor the range to repel a cavalry 
charge before physical contact was made. The lack of mass in the loose-formation and arguably 
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the individual character of the light infantry made them vulnerable to routing in a melee fight. 
Therefore, the light infantry executed specialist tasks like reconnaissance, covering the flanks of 
the line infantry and harassing the enemy to slow down its advance or retreat. Such tactics 
demanded a specialised training and an even more exceptional organisational capacity on the 
battlefield.87 
During the Napoleonic Wars, practice encouraged troops to train both in line- and light 
infantry tactics; naturally the Americans followed that example, and the Board of Tactics set in 
motion a process that would increasingly emphasise the adoption of light infantry tactics by line 
infantry. In addition it was also better applicable to the U.S. Army which was ‘too small and 
dispersed to sustain a solid system of infantry specialization.’88 The American Maj. C.K. Gardner believed 
that the militia would be more effective if they were trained in light infantry tactics. The already 
individual character of the militiaman was more easily moulded in the light infantry doctrine than 
the line infantry. Moreover Gardner foresaw an even broader application for light infantry 
tactics, as he considered the light infantry instruction ‘applicable to every infantry battalion’89. 
Still, during the Civil War, the distinction between light- and line infantry tactics 
remained in place because the light infantry was not yet regarded as able to act en mass 
unsupported by line infantry. A battalion in open-order was unprecedented and the 1825 infantry 
tactics instructed light infantry units to close their formation and withdraw to the main body in 
case they faced a cavalry charge.90 
In 1835, Scott again revised the American infantry regulations without significant 
changes to the light infantry tactics. The new edition was in effect a translation from the French 
1831 infantry tactics, which had altered the old French tactics of 1791 by incorporating the 
situational use of the two-rank line formation and by adding specific light infantry regulations. 
The American 1835 infantry tactics followed the French in the situational use of combined light- 
and line infantry tactics to repel cavalry charges. This development reflected the broader trend of 
employing an increasingly open order of battle, expressed by the increasingly higher interval of 
paces between files.91 The 1825 regulations prescribed a maximum interval of twelve paces, 
without considering the circumstances of the terrain. The 1835 regulations abandoned this limit 
of twelve paces. 
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Table 2 
Interval of paces 
Between files 
American 182592 American 183593 
Skirmish-order 6 10 or at most 15 
Maximum-order 12 – 
 
However, the reform which had increased the standard movement rates was undone by Scott in 
order to conform to the French practice of 1831. The 1825 regulations had prescribed double 
quick-time for all movements in loose-order, whereas the 1835 regulations prescribed double-
quick time only in situations of absolute necessity, added by the option of ordering the men to 
plainly run.94  Reading these regulations remained something totally different from executing 
them and higher movement rates could mean that soldiers fatigued more easily. According to the 
1825 regulations, officers were authorised to slow down their troops to prevent excessive 
fatigue;95 a fear also expressed by the 1835 regulations.96 
The 1855 regulations by Hardee, which were employed during the Civil War, show us 
that the adopted standard movement rates corresponded better to the 1825 regulations than to 
the 1835 regulations.97 Despite Scott’s brief fall back to French conservatism, the Board of 
Tactics had foreseen the use of increased standard movement speeds long before the arrival of 
the rifled-musket (which Hardee could take into consideration). Reasonably one cannot argue 
that the Board could foresee the use of quicker infantry movements as an answer to the 
technological advancements in weaponry; it is better to assume that the military legacy of the 
Revolutionary War in combination with the perceived different American terrain had already 
gently pushed the American infantry doctrine on this path.98 
 
Two different military traditions, both grounded in French theory, arose within the U.S Army: 
the doctrine of the Board based on the ‘modern tactics of manoeuvre and decisive battle’,99 and the 
tactical defensive expressed by the use of field fortifications advocated by military theorists at 
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West Point. 100  Since Thayer’s appointment, the USMA had emphasised civil- and military 
engineering. A prominent nineteenth century American military theorist (and protégé of Thayer) 
was Dennis Hart Mahan (1802 –1871), who after his graduation in 1824, was assigned to the 
Corps of Engineers.101 
Like his predecessors, Mahan travelled to France where he spent four years as a military 
observer and studied a year at the École d'application de l'Artillerieet du Génie in Metz. In France, 
Mahan learned that the French tactical doctrine was ideal for a professional European army, but 
not for the American army which mainly depended on irregular troops. In times of war, the 
small cadre of professional American regulars would be unable to bring the main body of 
irregulars up to their own professional standards quickly.102 Mahan was convinced that despite 
their ‘superior advantages’, such as the higher grade of moral and intellectual qualities, the irregulars 
required discipline and habitual training to withstand battles against regular infantry.103 
In 1832, Mahan was appointed Professor of Military and Civil Engineering at West 
Point, a senior position from which he was able to exert significant influence on the American 
military elite. West Point was already dominated by the Corps of Engineers, to which each year 
the graduating class commissioned their top ten to twenty per cent. Unsurprisingly, the Corps of 
Engineers would provide an uneven share of American officers above the divisional level during 
the Civil War.104 In addition to his senior position, Mahan further influenced the tactical doctrine 
through his published work, which was adopted by the academy as official textbooks. In 1836 
Mahan published the work A Complete Treatise on Field Fortification, replacing the work of Gay de 
Vernon.  
While Field Fortification was ‘steeped in French thought’,105 Mahan had adjusted his work to 
American military practice defined by the dependence of irregular troops, especially by rejecting 
the primacy of the concentrated frontal attack. The American irregulars were incompatible with 
such offensive tactics, which constituted harsh discipline and coincided with a high loss of life 
and therefore required the battle-hardened and disciplined regular for successful execution. 
Mahan further added that the ranks of the American citizen-soldiery ‘are filled with all that is most 
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valuable in society’,106  to which Hagerman adds, ‘and not to be overlooked by any military man in an 
egalitarian ideology, they were voters.’107 
Therefore Mahan advocated to ‘place the militia soldier on his natural field of battle, behind a 
breastwork, and an equilibrium between him and his more disciplined enemy is immediately established.’108 The 
tactical doctrine advocated in Field Fortification was centred on the active tactical defence, which 
stated, ‘the chief object of entrenchments is to enable the assailed to meet the enemy with success, by first compelling 
him to approach under every disadvantage of position, and then, when he has been cut up, to assume the offensive, 
and drive him back at the point of a bayonet.’109 While Mahan regarded the tactical defensive to be 
more appropriate for a U.S. Army that mainly depended on irregulars, he did not fully discard 
the tactical offensive. In 1852, Mahan did not consider the entrenched position tactically superior 
to a successfully executed massed frontal assault. Indeed, certain battles still required the mobility 
of conventional assault tactics, for example to turn the enemy’s flank.110 
In Field Fortification Mahan acknowledged the higher accuracy and longer range of the 
rifle, even mentioning promising technological developments to solve the low fire rate by breach 
loading. Still the higher accuracy of the rifle is only ‘some compensation’ over the less accurate, but 
higher fire rate of smooth-bore musket fire.111 In 1847 Mahan published An Elementary Treatise on 
Advanced-Guard, Outpost, and Detachment Service Troops. This was, according to Hagerman, in 
response to the development of the rifled-musket, which increased the range and accuracy while 
maintaining the common, but not necessarily practical muzzle loading of the smoothbore-
musket.112 
 In Outpost Mahan revised his views in response to the increased firepower of 
conventional assault tactics, advocating that attacking columns should take ‘every advantage of the 
ground to mask their movements’.113In prolonged engagements, skirmishers should be reinforced by 
small columns of line infantry ‘thoroughly conversant with the duties of skirmishers’, 114  positioned 
between the attacking skirmishers and the main body of troops. Furthermore, Mahan advocated 
the greater situational use of the dispersed order of all troops when attacking ‘positions in obstructed 
ground’115. 
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The nineteenth century debate on assault tactics was centred on the use of large or small 
attack column formations. Large attack columns were employed to overwhelm the enemy 
defenders by superior numbers. The danger, however, was that large attack columns could 
quickly end in an obstructing mass, which would lead to men being pushed forward unable to 
fight. The small attack columns were less likely to end in disarray on the regimental level116 and 
they were also more likely to compel each other to keep fighting, compared to a unanimous mass 
of ten thousand troops.117According to McWhiney, Jamieson Mahan had advocated two attack 
lines in the official academy Advanced-Guard textbook, from which the first wave advanced in line 
formation followed by the second wave advancing in small column formations. Reserves should 
be held back in column formations for manoeuvrability before deploying in line.118 
With his work Field Fortifications, Mahan had intended to adjust the French tactical 
doctrine to accommodate a mainly irregular army. Thereafter, in Outpost, Mahan advocated a 
modern tactical doctrine which was better suited to a professional army. In effect, Mahan had 
proposed two different tactical doctrines for two different types of armies. Griffith has viable 
concerns with the ambivalent theories proposed by Mahan, which according to him contained 
‘Delphic paradoxes’. 119  Paradoxically, Mahan advocated that, on one hand, armies should be 
prepared for the active tactical defence by throwing up breastworks and, on the other, maintain 
tactical mobility on the offensive. Therefore, Griffith blames Mahan for not fully grasping the 
reality that these specific doctrines would be lost in a large-scale mobilisation of irregulars.120 
 
 
1.3 The Mexican-American War 1846 – 1848 
In 1821, the Mexicans overthrew Spanish rule and established their own republic. Little more 
than a decade later, the Mexican government faced its own civil uprising with the secession of 
Texas. First encouraged by the Spanish and later by the Mexican officials, Anglo-American 
immigrants had migrated to Texas. Unfortunately for the Mexican government, in 1836 the 
Anglo-Americans established the Republic of Texas in the northern territories of Mexico. Under 
the pretence of Indian insurgencies, the federal government in Washington sent troops to Texas. 
While officially not involved in the Texas War of Independence (1835 – 1836), it was clear to the 
Mexican government where the American allegiances lay. 
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 In July 1845, the Texans voted in favour of the annexation treaty proposed by the U.S. 
Congress. Mexico considered the joining of Texas to the Union, an American act of war.121 The 
outbreak of the Mexican-American War (1846 – 1848) would become the baptism of fire for the 
reformed and professionalised U.S. Army. The administration of President James K. Polk (1845 
– 1849) faced a worthy adversary on paper as there was strong nationalistic support from the 
Mexican public for the war and some European commentators predicted a victory for the young 
Mexican nation-state.122 
The Mexican army was substantially larger than the U.S. Army, and in addition to the 
recent invasions of the Spanish and French, the Mexican officer corps (much like their American 
counterparts) had gained combat experience against domestic (Indian and Texan) insurgencies. 
However, the Mexican soldiers lacked training and were poorly equipped, especially the artillery 
branch. While the U.S. Army had egalitarian origins, the Mexican army had inherited a Spanish 
aristocrat officer corps which was characterised by a higher regard for the cavalry than for the 
other two army branches. The common Mexican soldier, especially the local militia, 
compensated for their overall low military capacity with the zeal instilled by the defence of their 
homes against yet another foreign invader.123 
The Mexican-American War has been called a ‘rehearsal for the Civil War’, 124  which it 
literally was for the junior officers serving in the U.S. Army. Thirteen years after the Mexican-
American War, many would face each other as senior officers in the Union and Confederate 
armies. On the strategic level, the war in Mexico showed other resemblances to the Civil War. 
The U.S. Army was forced to invade Mexico and to suppress the Mexican territorial aspirations, 
much like the Union armies were forced to invade the Confederate states to end the secession. 
Mexican armies had the advantage of interior operational lines and knowledge of the terrain, just 
like the Confederate armies had of their territory during the Civil War. Finally, Mexico, like the 
Confederacy, hoped to prolong the war to gain foreign recognition for their cause and 
subsequently diminish American public support for the invasion.125 
 The Mexican hopes for victory were however suppressed by the U.S. Army and the 
military reformers would finally witness the success of their efforts to professionalise the 
American military. Before 1812, the three distinct army branches, infantry, cavalry and artillery, 
along with a functioning staff-system had not existed. Now, in Mexico these three branches 
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would prove their value by supplementing each other and thereby acting as one coherent force. 
The infantry served as the backbone of the army, equally strong on the offensive as defensive. 
The highly mobile cavalry served for reconnaissance and shock tactics by charging down the 
enemy on the battlefield, while the artillery supported movements of infantry and cavalry with 
long range firepower. Armed with standardised weaponry and tactical doctrine, each branch 
would meet the requirements of their combat roles effectively.126 
The American infantry was still a mix of regular and irregular troops, the latter consisting 
of militiamen and volunteers. The militia had mainly administrative and logistical tasks, as they 
were not allowed to serve outside their state borders. On the other hand, the volunteers were 
allowed to serve for extended periods and outside their state borders.127 While President Polk 
had intended a leading role for the volunteers in Mexico, their efforts were not decisive in battle. 
Ultimately relative few of them saw actual combat.128 The drill-training of volunteers mainly 
depended on the willingness of their commanding officers.129 Moreover, volunteers expected to 
retain their civilian privileges, which did not contribute to the effectiveness of drill-instructions. 
As a result, officers commanded these men more loosely, which further obstructed their abilities 
to act en masse.130 Future Union General George Meade wrote: ‘we could march to the City of Mexico, 
but I doubt the practicability of doing so with a force of volunteers’ while the regulars ‘made war against the 
Army and Government of Mexico, and not against the people – the volunteers commenced to excite feelings of 
indignation and hatred in the bosom of the people, by their outrages on them.’131 
Still, in a rapid pace, the U.S. Army would defeat the Mexican enemy time and again and 
while all three army branches actively fought on the offensive, remarkably none suffered high 
losses in battle. After the first major engagement, the Battle at Palo Alto (May 8, 1846), Maj. 
Gen. Zachary Taylor reported the loss of only two per cent of his men (55 of 2,228) and after 
the Battle of Resaca de la Palma (May 9, 1846), he reported a loss of six per cent. The 
Commanding General of the Army, Winfield Scott faced the Mexicans at the Battle of Cerro 
Gordo (April 18, 1847) in a strong fortified position; nevertheless, he only reported a five per 
cent loss. The combined American losses of the bloodiest battles of Contreras, Churubusco, 
Molino Del Rey and Chapultepec only totalled 2,700 men.132 
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 The success of the tactical offensive by the U.S. Army was confirmed by the relative light 
losses against a mostly defensive positioned enemy. Even from behind their fortifications and 
field works, the Mexicans had no answer to the well-orchestrated American military 
performance. After the victory at Resaca de la Palma, American military theorist and future 
Union Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck (1815 –1872) wrote, ‘The Americans attacked the whole line with 
skirmishers, and with dragoons supported by light artillery, and the charge of a heavy column of infantry decided 
the victory.’133 The effectiveness of a professionally executed tactical doctrine was maybe new to 
the Americans, but in the end, the tactics (and equipment) employed in Mexico differed little 
from those employed by the early-nineteenth century armies in Europe. 
The American infantry mainly fought in close-order two-rank line formations, firing 
concentrated musket volleys followed by a bayonet charge in column against fortified positions. 
The cavalry was held back until the enemy formations disintegrated to charge them down with 
the sabre, while the artillery had seen action on the offensive and defensive. In Mexico, the 
regulars of the U.S. Army had proven to have mastered the complex modern tactics of the 
nineteenth century.134 
 The infantry doctrine developed by Scott and the Board of Tactics had proven to be 
successful in Mexico. The adoption of increased movement rates and the two-line formation had 
contributed to the rapid success of the U.S. Army in Mexico. The relative small American force 
had defeated a numerically superior enemy, which fought from the tactical defensive. However, 
the tactical defensive as advocated by Mahan and expressed by an increased use of field 
fortifications, gained little recognition after the war against Mexico. Even from behind their field 
fortifications, the Mexican regulars and irregulars were no match for the American regular 
troops.135 
Halleck, however, did not lose faith in the doctrine advocated by his mentor, arguing that 
the Mexican field fortifications were too poorly constructed. Whether true or not, in the Battle 
of Cero Gordo, Scott had sent his men uphill to break through the field fortifications and 
capture the Mexican stronghold on top. The American regulars succeeded in capturing the 
fortified Mexican left, while the volunteers failed to capture the fortified right and were repelled 
by the Mexican troops.136 The military experience in Mexico had revealed the true value of a 
professional army and officer corps, at least ending public talk of closing the USMA at West 
Point.137 
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Still, public support for a professional army remained small as the American ideal of the citizen-
soldier forged in the Revolutionary War persisted. Since the establishment of the U.S. Army in 
the nineteenth century, its veterans had fought against British and Mexican forces. These large-
scale but limited military endeavours had been fought along the lines of the nation-state using 
nineteenth century warfare. More often the American soldiers had faced the other inhabitants of 
their continent, the native-Indians.  
To secure their lands and ways of life, the Indians fought prolonged but small scale 
irregular wars against the federal government in Washington. However, the American military 
showed no professional interest to these Indian Wars, which can be explained by the fact that no 
Indian army ever posed a serious threat to the federal government in Washington. Occasionally 
the U.S. army suffered unnecessary and embarrassing defeats, even during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Still, during the most successful military campaigns of the native Seminoles 
in Florida (1816 – 1858), the Indians proved unable to deliver decisive strategic victories against 
the federal troops. The path chosen by the military reformers had prepared the American 
military for conventional warfare along the lines of the nation-state and eventually prepared the 
North and South to fight each other.138 
After the War of 1812, military and political reformers had established the necessary 
institutions to make the American military capacity and capability sustainable in times of peace. 
The U.S. Army now consisted of three distinct army branches, equipped with a standardised set 
of drill instructions and tactical manuals, supplemented by one uniform administrative standard. 
Furthermore, to obtain the latest professional knowledge, observer missions were imposed. 
Future Union General George B. McClellan, for example, was sent to observe the Crimean War 
(1853 – 1856) as a member of the Delafield-commission. During times of peace, the core cadre 
of combat experienced officers could finally be supplemented by cadets from West Point as their 
training compensated for (although not substituted) their lack of combat experience. 
The doctrinal and organisational reforms, initiated during the 1820s and 1830s, had 
proven their worth during the war against Mexico. These legacies were inherited by the armies of 
the American Civil War, along with the technological advancements of the 1850s. Of which the 
advancements in weaponry were ultimately incorporated into the patterns of tactical thought 
established during those early decades of the nineteenth century. The continued path of reform 
could not have prepared the American soldiers and officers for their next crucible. The regular 
army was never intended to serve as a training-cadre for militiamen and volunteers numbering in 
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the hundreds of thousands. The model for the professional army was hardly ideal for the Union 
and Confederate armies. Nevertheless, it was the only model available and the remaining regulars 
needed no further encouragement to adopt the training-intensive military system that had proven 
so successful in Mexico.139 
On the tactical level, the Mexican-American War revealed developments which would 
only show their full impact during the Civil War. While the tactical offensive had been successful 
during the campaigns in Mexico, the undercurrent of military thought which advocated the 
tactical defensive was on the rise. Halleck and protégé of Mahan published his work Elements of 
Military Art and Science in 1846, in which he underlined the belief that the American citizen-soldier 
would prove to be equal to his European professional counterpart from the safety of an 
entrenched position. While Halleck can hardly be considered to have posed any innovative 
theories of his own, he amplified the trend set in motion by his mentor among American senior 
officers and military theorists, arguing that the massed frontal assault in Mexico only prevailed 
due to the poorly constructed Mexican fortifications.140 
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Chapter 2 The American infantry doctrine 1848 – 1861 
 
2.1 The rifled-musket and light infantry tactics 
After the Mexican-American War, the U.S. Army continued on the path of professionalisation 
reflected by an emphasis on training and discipline. Furthermore, it developed, manufactured 
and adopted a new rifled-musket which was complemented by the adoption of the latest French 
light infantry doctrine. In the same line of thought as the previous tactical reforms, the adoption 
of yet another French tactical doctrine was blended with the existing American military practice. 
Ultimately, the intention was to equip and train all infantry units in the use of the rifled-musket 
and the latest light infantry tactics instead of receiving a limited training in skirmish- and target 
practice.141 
Until the introduction of the rifled-musket, infantry had been armed with the 
smoothbore muzzle-loading flintlock musket. The bullet, a heavy round ball, could travel over 
four and up to five hundred yards (457 metres).Aiming over these ranges however was useless 
and even in massed volleys over two hundred yards (182 metres), the target could be easily 
missed. It was only at around fifty or sixty yards (45 or 54 metres) that soldiers could be 
expected to hit their targets with a smoothbore-musket. While training and practice could teach 
soldiers to utilise the technical abilities of the smoothbore-musket more effectively, the weapon 
remained overall technically insufficient for aimed fire. 
Between 1815 and 1861, the smoothbore-musket would see some notable improvements 
as the flintlock was replaced by a percussion cap, increasing water resistance to the extent that 
one could fire the weapon in rainy weather. Moreover, the cap was more easily replaced, which 
slightly increased the rate of fire.142 In 1847, the French army officer Claude-Etienne Minié 
invented a new bullet which would accelerate the adoption of the rifled-musket. Before the 
invention of the Minié ball, the use of rifled-muskets was problematic. Unlike the smoothbore-
musket, the barrel of a rifled-musket had grooves which would bring a fired bullet into a spin, 
thereby making its trajectory more accurate. However, to grasp the grooves, the bullet had to fit 
tightly into the rifled-barrel. Therefore reloading the musket required a considerable amount of 
force, and sometimes even a mallet was needed to fit the bullet into place. The use of rifled-
muskets was therefore limited to specialised infantry units.  
The Minié ball addressed the problem of reloading a rifled-musket; the conical bullet had 
a wooden plug fitted into the hollow base. When fired, the pressure expanded the wooden plug, 
thereby grasping the grooves of the rifled-barrel. The American gunsmith James H. Burton 
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invented a more cost effective variant of the Minié ball, which could expand under pressure 
without a wooden plug. Tests conducted by the American Ordnance Department showed that 
the larger conical Burton bullet was able to penetrate a three-and-a-quarter inch (2.5 centimetres) 
thick pine plank over a range of one-hundred yards (91 metres). 143  The rifled-musket in 
combination with the Burton bullet was not only lethal over a longer range, it also maintained its 
accuracy over greater distances.  
While the Ordnance Department was not as progressive with the adoption of a breech-
loading rifle, the Department followed the technical developments regarding small firearms in 
Europe closely and conducted repeated tests with the latest European and American firearms.144 
During the Civil War, the standard rifled-musket equipped by Union troops was the Model 1861 
Springfield rifle, which had an effective range of between three and four hundred yards (247 and 
365 metres) and could kill at one thousand yards (914 metres); the standard Confederate rifled-
musket, the Pattern 1853 Enfield, had similar specifications.145 
 
The Secretary of War between 1853 and 1857 (and later Confederate President) Jefferson F. 
Davis (1808 –1889) recognised the importance of these technical improvements in weaponry. 
While the Ordnance Department developed, tested and manufactured rifled-muskets, Secretary 
Davis ordered Lt. Col. William J. Hardee (1815 – 1873) to formulate a new tactical manual which 
would complement the new weaponry.146 Hardee based his manual directly on the light infantry 
doctrine of the French chasseurs à pied. Since 1838, this elite light infantry unit used their rifles for 
long-range aimed fire, sabre-bayonet fencing and employed an increased movement rate. While 
Hardee included the emphasis on aimed fire and an increased movement rate in his manual, the 
sabre-bayonet fencing and hard physical training of the chasseurs were left out. 
Still, the virtues of peak physical conditioning did find their way into the American 
infantry doctrine as another French infantry unit served as an example for the elite infantry units 
in the Civil War.147 In France the American Col. Emory Upton had witnessed the Zouaves, a 
French elite light infantry unit, based on a concept originating from Algeria. The French 
campaigns in North Africa were closely followed by the American officers who saw romanticised 
resemblances with their own skirmishes against the native-Americans on the western frontiers.148 
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The so-called American Zouave training was characterised by hard physical training in 
conjunction with the colourful uniforms; it was a conscious attempt to create elite American 
infantry units. However, the Zouave training did not reflect the tactics employed by the chasseurs 
as the American Zouaves were rather renowned for their colourful display than their ability to 
execute complex light infantry tactics. During the Civil War, the Zouave regiments were left out 
of the general sources of recruitment to maintain their special status. Naturally over the course 
of the war their losses were not compensated and these regiments dissipated, and with them the 
benefits of their training.149 
Hardee made further adjustments to the chasseurs manual by adding instructions for firing 
and reloading from kneeled and prone positions. In addition, he contacted fellow officers in 
search for publications with instructions for formations larger than a single battalion.150 While 
Hardee maintained the basic movement rates of the 1835 Tactics, he added higher movement 
rates for the double quick-time and the run. In his regulations, Scott had included double-time, 
but only advocated limited use. Hardee, however, advocated a more common use of the double 
quick-time and, in addition, he lengthened the step, giving the soldier not only a faster but also a 
longer stride. Under exceptional circumstances, Hardee advised an even higher double quick-
time of one hundred and eighty steps a minute, which let the soldier cover four thousand yards 
(3.7 kilometres) over twenty-five minutes, adding the novel advice of breathing through the nose 
to delay fatigue.151 In general, Hardee’s manual emphasised an increased speed and mobility of 
tactical movements to mitigate the increased firepower of the rifled-musket.152 
In late July 1854, Hardee submitted his draft to the Board of Tactics for review; field 
trials were held by the cadets between August and December at West Point and the official 
report was issued by the Board in December 1854. The report stated that Hardee’s manual for 
light infantry tactics should supplement the existing drill instructions of the line infantry (Scott’s 
1835 infantry tactics) or, in the words of the Board, ‘to present concisely, a view of this system and its 
general harmony with the existing drill for heavy infantry’. 153  Secretary Davis took over the 
recommendations of the Board and authorised Hardee’s manual to be ‘adopted for the instruction of 
the troops when acting as light infantry or riflemen’.154 
In addition, the president of the Board, Lt. Col. Silas Casey advocated a revision of the 
line infantry tactics, and in 1857, the War Department ordered all infantry to be regularly 
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exercised in Hardee’s tactics. According to Casey, practice had revealed that line infantry was 
already ‘usually employed as light troops.’155 However, the distinction between light- and line infantry 
was still not abandoned as confirmed by the distribution of different musket-models by the 
Ordnance Department. The standard .58 calibre Springfield Model 1855 rifled-musket fitted with 
the socket-bayonet was intended for line infantry, while the .58 calibre Springfield Model 1855 
rifle fitted with the sabre-bayonet was intended for light infantry. Furthermore, the Springfield 
1855 rifle was 6.6 inches (16.7 centimetres) shorter than the Springfield 1855 rifled-musket. The 
shorter rifle was intended to accompany the mobility of the light infantry; the sabre-bayonet was 
influenced by the new French concept of bayonet fencing. The later 1857 and 1858 rifles were 
equipped with special crosshair front sights not used on the rifled-musket.156 
Hardee’s manual is described by Paddy Griffith as a package which was ‘attractively complete 
and apparently ‘modern’ in its philosophy.’157 However, Griffith also argues that despite the recognition 
of an increased importance for light infantry tactics, it would not prove to be revolutionary 
because it ‘by no means abolished the traditional concept of fighting in line, shoulder to shoulder, two deep.’158 
The American tactical reforms were therefore as innovative as European practice prescribed. 
Such argumentation is however blind to the American willingness to adopt innovative 
infantry tactics. In 1859, Captain Cadmus M. Wilcox (1824 – 1890) published his work Rifles and 
Rifle Practice which contributed to the development of infantry tactics combined with the rifled-
musket. According to Wilcox, fortifications would lose their need for complexity because the 
rifled-musket would be equally effective in defending basic fortified constructions.159 Moreover, 
the rifled-musket would more easily provoke battles over a longer range, which would put a 
strain on the effective command and control of soldiers. 160  Therefore, effective training 
intensified discipline and use of the terrain for cover was needed to keep the command and 
control in pace with the more open order of battle and thereby the prevalence of the tactical 
offensive. As the command and control of troops was still primarily carried by the voice, music 
signals and orderlies carrying written orders.161 
 Despite his criticism of the likes of Scott, Hardee and Casey, Griffith admits that their 
published works were never intended to present a system of fixed laws which could fully prepare 
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the soldiers for the reality of the battlefield.162 Even Hardee’s exemplars, the chasseurs à pied were, 
despite their specialised role, forced in massed frontal assaults during the Crimean War (1853 – 
1856) and the Second Italian War of Independence (1859).163 The proposed military theories on 
infantry tactics ultimately came down to the capability of the soldiers to comprehend and bring 
them into practice when they were ordered to do so. Until now, the American infantry doctrine 
had been successful on paper and in practice, proven by the success of the regular army in 
Mexico. The vast armies raised during the Civil War would truly challenge the application of the 
proposed infantry tactics. 
 
 
2.2 The creation of Union and Confederate armies 
From 1861, the sectional crisis between the North and South deteriorated to the point that the 
institutions of the federal government came under severe pressure. The federal U.S. Army, 
including supporting institutions like the USMA, began losing the loyalty of its soldiers and 
officers. Until the outbreak of the Civil War; 1292 officers served in the U.S. Army, of whom 
923 would remain loyal to the federal cause, while 369 officers sided with the Confederacy. Of 
the total 1,902 alumni from the VMI in Lexington, 1,781 (re)enlisted with the C.S. Army.164 
The total number of 1292 available regular officers was roughly doubled by appointing 
re-enlisted veterans and citizens with leadership capabilities. Less than 3000 experienced and 
trained officers were initially available for the command of a total 3,050,000 troops serving in the 
Civil War. This meant that only one trained or experienced officer was available for each 
regiment of roughly one thousand troops. Regulations prescribed at least thirty-nine 
commanding officers for each regiment, excluding the even higher number of required staff 
officers.165 
In short, ninety-eight per cent of the officers appointed during the Civil War were 
inexperienced and insufficiently trained. Naturally, many of these officers would face their 
limitations under the stress of combat, but remarkably many more succeeded to fulfil their role 
accordingly. Griffith concludes that the level of proficiency between officers trained at West 
Point and civilians trained in combat cannot be determined.166 According to Hsieh, the first year 
of the war gives a reasonable idea how ‘West Pointers’ performed their duties as CO’s. Since 
promising lower ranking officers, without a West Point background, had to earn their promotion 
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in combat.167 The Confederate command highly valued the training at West Point as CO’s in the 
C.S. Army were ranked on their class standing and graduation year rather than their former rank 
in the U.S. Army.168 
Nonetheless, in the first years of the war both sides had to accept an inexperienced 
officer cadre, which was reflected in the effectiveness of their armies (or lack thereof). All the 
organisational levels of an army had to function properly to ensure the basic requirements for 
operation, such as disciplined troops which received a minimal level of training, equipment, 
provisions and pay. Naturally, over time more promising and capable officers would rise through 
the ranks, thereby increasing the overall effectiveness of the army.169 
At the height of the Mexican-American War, the federal government had raised 115.000 
troops170 at the outbreak of the Civil War; the U.S. Army was comprised of only 16.000 troops.171 
On March 6, 1861, the Confederate Congress in Richmond authorised the creation of an army of 
100.000 troops. By May, the Confederate forces increased in size to no less than 400.000 troops. 
In a response to the first Confederate attack on Fort Sumter (April 15, 1861) President Abraham 
Lincoln (1809 –1865) called upon 75.000 state militiamen for a ninety day federal service. Within 
the year the Union states raised a staggering 700.000 militiamen.172 
On paper a standard regiment in 1861 consisted of a headquarters, marching band and 
one thousand troops divided into ten companies. In practice, such regimental standardisation 
was not present and numbers would vary in time and place. While at the start of the war, 
regiments often consisted of more than a thousand troops, naturally over time this number was 
reduced. On average, the combat strength of a regiment on campaign during the Civil War was 
four hundred troops, a Union regiment a dozen above and a Confederate regiment a dozen 
below average. The average combat strength of an experienced regiment was even lower, around 
two hundred troops due to loss in combat.173 
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Table 3174 
Organisational structure  
of formations 
Brigades Regiments Battalions Companies Soldiers 
Division 2 or 3     
Brigade  2, 3 or 4    
Regiment   2 or 3    10175  
Battalion    8  
Company     82 
 
While such battle-hardened regiments were relatively small, they could pose a formidable fighting 
force. Apart from a higher resilience to the stress of combat, their smaller size made them easy 
to command through voice and personal example. The resilience of regiments in combat 
depended heavily on their institutional continuity; the longer a regiment campaigned together on 
the lower levels of command, the higher the morale of its troops. While the transfer of a 
regiment in a new brigade could pose some friction, disbanding a regiment or the transfer of its 
companies to other regiments could pose much larger problems for morale. Regiments were 
formed on the basis of state and ethnic origin and even on the origin of nationality. Therefore 
appointing new companies to a regiment could undermine its overall cohesion.176 
 
Table 4177 
Number of formations  
in the field 
Union 
Min. 
Confederate 
Min. 
Union  
Max. 
Confederate 
Max. 
Union  
Most Frequent 
Confederate  
Most Frequent 
Corps  
per army 
1 1 8 4 3 2 
Divisions  
per corps 
2 2 6 7 3 3 
Brigades 
 per division 
2 2 5 7 3 4 
Regiments  
per brigade 
2 2 12 20 4 5 
 
In 1861, the North and South not only lacked a strong cadre of officers, the combat capability of 
the soldiers was also fairly limited. Most soldiers had an overall ignorance of military tradition 
and no combat experience. The military elite was not oblivious to the shortcomings of these 
massive irregular armies and the senior officers, who had witnessed the birth of the U.S. Army in 
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the earl-nineteenth century, warned Washington about the limited capability of these improvised 
armies.178 
 
 
2.3 The drill-training of Union and Confederate soldiers 
The Union and Confederate regiments were composed of a cross-section of nineteenth century 
American society, thus each regiment represented an above average level of intellect compared 
to professional European regiments. The value of drill training was therefore quickly 
acknowledged by soldiers and officers. 179  Soldiers were trained hour after hour; a Virginian 
soldier commented, ‘we drill six times a day in the hot sun’. 180  After European practice, the 
Confederate Col. A.P. Hill instructed to first train manoeuvres on the squad and company level 
before training on the battalion and regimental level. The Confederate Lt. James Langhorne 
wrote that his commanding officer Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson ‘had his whole brigade drilling at a 
charge bayonets double quick time for the last week.’181 
According to Griffith, drill training provided two benefits described as follows: ‘the tactical 
articulation in the period leading up to close combat, and esprit de corps once the serious killing had begun.’182 
Tactical articulation can be explained as the ability to move in large formations under different 
combat and terrain circumstances, which in turn made the command by officers of formations 
more effective. In addition, well-executed drill instructions on the battlefield could instil fear in 
the enemy when a disciplined and cohesive force closed in on them. However, in the heat of 
battle, the execution of drill instruction became increasingly difficult, which could result in the 
loss of cohesion and reduce the combat effectiveness of the formation.183 
When the chaos of battle struck panic in the troops and the tactical articulation was lost, 
the ‘esprit de corps’ should suppress the panic. Under fire, the abstract ideals for which men had 
taken up arms were easily forgotten, so instead their comrades would compel them to keep 
fighting. The longer troops practiced drill instructions together, the more proficient they became 
and bonded as a unit. This while gaining pride in their regiment and ‘suppressing or stifling the spirit 
of individualism’.184 In battle, veterans would encourage their younger comrades who were more 
susceptible to fear and panic. In the tactical manual of the chasseurs à pied, this supervision in 
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support of each other was termed surveillance. In close-order formations, surveillance functioned 
better than in open-order skirmish formations.185 
Still, drill training was only one condition for discipline; the other was strong leadership. 
When troops closed in on the enemy, the troops were more likely to trigger out of order 
reactions. For example, when the command was given to fire, it was very hard for soldiers to 
stop before their ammunition was depleted. While the problem of uncontrolled fire had been 
recognised by Winfield Scott, he could not provide an effective solution to include in the 
infantry doctrine. Griffith remarks that firing their muskets or storming towards the enemy was 
experienced by soldiers as a ‘positive act’ which released the tensions of months of boredom and 
hardship.186 
In 1862, the official infantry doctrine based on the 1835 Infantry Tactics of Winfield Scott 
and supplemented by Hardee’s Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics, was replaced by the Infantry Tactics of 
former president of the Board of Tactics, Silas Casey. The 1862 Infantry Tactics were based on the 
French ordonnances of 1831 and 1845187 and combined Scott’s third volume and Hardee’s first two 
volumes. The C.S. Army followed the U.S. Army in the adoption of revisions.188 The preparation 
of the Union and Confederate soldiers for war was limited to drill training and the information 
found in the tactical manuals. The manuals of Casey and Hardee were intended to instruct 
officers and soldiers on how to perform basic infantry movements.  
Instead tactical manuals served as a replacement for the lack of large-scale field exercises; 
war games with live ammunition under the supervision of an experienced officer cadre would at 
least have given inexperienced troops a sense of what they could expect on the battlefield rather 
than implying that ‘if you read this slim volume you will find everything you need to know.’189 These manuals 
were not intended to bridge the gap between theory and practice of the battlefield, but were 
nonetheless criticised for their lack of realism and sparked a general aversion towards their use. 
Apart from the fact that these manuals were written after French example and were intended for 
use by professional soldiers, the ideas taken from the chasseurs à pied reflected the most effective 
and modern infantry tactics of that time. 
The problem, according to Griffith, however was that the limitations of these tactical 
manuals were never explained. The reason for their supposed inapplicability was rather that these 
manuals were placed into the hands of a well-educated army without further clarification. In the 
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end too much was expected from these tactical manuals, while the wider context in which they 
were written was neglected. This could have been corrected if the tactical doctrine would have 
been reviewed or evaluated during the war, attending to the criticism in the field.190 At the start 
of the war both sides had no choice than to rely on the experience most of their irregular troops 
had acquired as volunteers and militiamen. There was little time left to enlighten these men into 
the finer details of large scale infantry fighting. As most effort was put into the drill-training, 
which would let these loosely formed bands of militiamen function as an army in the first place. 
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Part Two 
The warfare of the American Civil War 
1861 – 1864 
 
‘But before going on with my narrative I want to digress & tell about a curious little idiosyncracy which was 
developing itself, in both armies, & among both officers & men, under the test & stress of battle for the first time. 
I had already noticed it in reading the newspaper accounts of the little collisions which were beginning to occur in 
various directions, & had likened it in my mind to the way in which a person lays hold of an iron which he knows 
is hot, but does not at all know how hot–whether only uncomfortably warm, or hot enough to make the flesh 
sizzle. He does not grab it promptly with a full strong grip but picks it up & drops it for a time or two, till he 
gets the measure of the heat & sees whether he can stand it. Well it was in very much that way that officers & 
men took hold of fighting at first.’191 
 
Chapter 3 Bull Run to Antietam 1861 – 1862 
 
3.1 The First Battle of Bull Run July 21, 1861 
In early July 1861, federal forces amassed around Washington to defend the capital. Some 35,000 
troops were organised into a field army and came under the command of the Brig. Gen. Irvin 
McDowell (1818 – 1885), who would lead his ‘Army of North eastern Virginia’ in an offensive 
against the Confederate forces of General Beauregard.192 The federal General-in-Chief Winfield 
Scott had not envisaged such a direct strategic approach; he believed that the inexperienced 
Union troops would not yet be capable of an offensive so early in the Civil War.193 
 Scott proposed an alternate strategic plan or the ‘Anaconda Plan’; Union armies would 
wait until the autumn of 1861 before moving down south, because during this time of the year 
the rivers would rise providing easy inland access. Moving south along the Mississippi River, the 
river could provide the Union armies with exterior supply and communication lines. Moreover, 
the Mississippi River would be brought back under federal control, thereby denying the 
Confederates the same inland access routes into the North.194 A naval blockade all along the 
Southern coastlines would further deny the Confederacy access to supply and transport routes by 
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sea. The federal navy set up the blockade, but Scott’s plan to move along the Mississippi River in 
autumn was abandoned, only to be reintroduced in the federal strategy in 1862.195 
During a meeting on June 29, 1861 in the White House with the cabinet and President 
Abraham Lincoln, Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell submitted his own plan. McDowell proposed an 
overland march towards Manassas, Virginia located between Washington and the Confederate 
capital of Richmond. Since the Southern secession there had been strong public outcries for 
quick and decisive action against the rebels, and President Lincoln answered these calls by 
appointing McDowell commander of the Army of North eastern Virginia.196 McDowell’s plan 
served the still limited strategic objectives of the President; a federal victory would be a clear 
message to the rebellion and tactically could pave the way for a quick capture of Richmond, 
ending the Civil War altogether.197 
The general belief was that the Civil War could be won by capturing strategic objectives 
and occupying territory, but ultimately the war could only be won by completely destroying each 
other’s armies and hinterland.198 McDowell’s first strategic objective was to force a path into 
northern Virginia and cross a tributary of the Occoquan River, the Bull Run, about twenty-five 
miles (40 kilometres) west of Washington.199 His path however was blocked by the Confederate 
‘Army of the Potomac’ under the command of General P.G.T. Beauregard (1818 –1893), who 
had positioned his troops at the railroads of Manassas-Junction not far south of the Bull Run.  
The Union army, some 34,000 men strong, was organised into twelve brigades divided 
over five divisions; the fifty-three artillery pieces were evenly divided over each brigade. 200 
However, the effective number of Union troops committed to battle was lower. Most of the 4th 
Division was held in reserve while the 5th Division was held entirely. On July 16, McDowell gave 
the order to march towards the towns of Centreville and Manassas.201 The Union army, however, 
was slowed down by a poorly organised supply train and the inexperience of the irregular troops 
to march over prolonged distances.  
On the early morning of July 20, the vanguard of McDowell’s army finally reached 
Centreville, three miles (5 kilometres) to the northeast of the Bull Run creek.202 Beauregard had 
positioned his troops along the south bank of the creek; the battle line was some eight miles (13 
kilometres) long, from Sudley Springs in the northwest down to Mitchell’s Ford in the southeast 
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and directly south of Centreville.203 From Centreville ran a road – the Warrenton Turnpike – to 
the town of Alexandria in the west, which crossed the creek at the Stone Bridge. Furthermore, 
the creek could be crossed at several fordable points: at Sudley Springs in the northwest; Farm 
Ford, just above the Stone Bridge; Lewis Ford, Ball’s Ford and Island Ford, south of the Stone 
Bridge; Mitchell’s Ford and Blackburn’s Ford directly south of Centreville and finally McLean’s 
Ford and Union Mills Ford further down to the southeast. Only a mile (1.6 kilometres) to the 
southwest of the Stone Bridge stood Henry House Hill; behind it to the southwest stood Bald 
Hill and next to it stood Matthews Hill to the northwest.204 
The higher south bank of the creek was occupied by the Confederate ‘Army of the 
Potomac’, some 20,000 men strong. The Army of the Potomac was organised into seven 
brigades and one reserve brigade. The forty artillery pieces were divided and attached to each 
brigade in addition to the four Virginian cavalry regiments. Beauregard’s line of defence 
extended over almost five miles (8 kilometres) from the Stone Bridge to Union Mills Ford. 
Beauregard’s army was not the only Confederate force near Manassas. The Confederate ‘Army 
of Shenandoah’ was positioned some fifty-four miles (87 kilometres) to the northwest in the 
town of Winchester. Under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston (1807 –1891), a 12,000 
man army was organised into four brigades and the twenty artillery pieces were divided and 
attached to each brigade, supported by 1st Virginia cavalry regiment. 
Meanwhile, McDowell had positioned his troops around Centreville and detached the 4th 
Division, 5,000 men strong, ordering them to march eastward to guard the rear of the army.205 
McDowell’s plan of battle was to hold Beauregard’s troops in the position at the Stone Bridge; in 
the meantime his main force would march around the Confederate army, in the direction of 
Sudley Springs and turn against the Confederate left flank. 206  The 2nd Division and the 3rd 
Division would cross the Bull Run at Sudley Springs and move south. The 1st Division would 
feint an attack at the Stone Bridge, while the division’s 4th Brigade would take up positions at 
Blackburn’s Ford to prevent a Confederate counter attack on the Union left flank. 
 From 19 July, the Army of Shenandoah began to arrive at Manassas-Junction (although 
the 4th Brigade would not arrive until July 21) to reinforce Beauregard. While Johnston held a 
higher rank, Beauregard was granted field command; his battle plan was to attack the Union left 
flank at Blackburn’s Ford and Mitchell’s Ford in order to advance towards Centreville. Although 
the Confederates were outnumbered, they held strong defensive positions.207 If both battle plans 
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were successfully executed, the Union and Confederate armies would manoeuvre in a huge 
counter clockwise direction.208 
 The former federal officers of the U.S. Army were evenly divided among the 
Confederate regular and irregular troops. In the Union army, Scott had ordered to leave the 
regular officers only in command of regular troops. Scott had opposed the dispersion of the 
already scarce number of experienced and trained officers. As a result, McDowell had two 
completely regular infantry battalions and two completely regular artillery batteries at his 
disposal.209 
On the early morning of 21 July, at 2:30 a.m. McDowell ordered his 2nd and 3rd Division 
to move southwest along the Warrenton Turnpike before turning northwest to the crossing at 
Sudley Springs. The 1st Division moved along the Warrenton Turnpike towards the Stone Bridge, 
while the division’s 4th Brigade moved towards Mitchell’s Ford. Surprised by the sudden attack of 
McDowell, Beauregard was awakened at 5:15 a.m. by the Union 4th Brigade advancing towards 
Mitchell’s Ford.210 Elements of the 1st Division reached the Stone Bridge at 6:00 a.m. where the 
Union Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler faced the small 7th Brigade of the Army of the Potomac under the 
command of Confederate Col. Nathan Evans. Around 9:00 a.m., Evans witnessed that the 
Union troops made no serious attempt to cross the Stone Bridge. At the same time, the 
Confederate Chief Signal Officer, Capt. Edward Porter Alexander, spotted the flanking 
manoeuvre by the Union 2nd and 3rd Division at Sudley Springs.211 
 At 9:30 a.m., the 2nd Division reached the crossing at Sudley Springs and by now Evans 
was informed by Capt. Alexander of the Union flanking manoeuvre. Confident that the 1st 
Division would not force a breakthrough at the Stone Bridge, Evans ordered troops to take up 
positions on the western slopes of Matthews Hill. Meanwhile, in preparation for a counter attack 
on the Union left flank, Beauregard sent the ambivalent order: ‘hold in readiness to advance at a 
moment’s notice’ to Brig. Gen. Richard S. Ewell of the 2nd Brigade at Union Mills Ford. To support 
Ewell’s advance, the 3rd Brigade of General David R. Jones was ordered to move into position 
across the Bull Run. However, Jones discovered he was advancing alone, as Ewell made no 
attempt to advance himself and remained in position at Union Mills Ford.212 
 The Union 2nd Division, under the command of Col. Ambrose E. Burnside (1824 –1881) 
had crossed the creek and reached the Confederate positions of Evans at Matthews Hill. 
However, Burnside experienced difficulties in manoeuvring his irregulars in position to form a 
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line of battle. Eventually, Burnside succeeded and, supported by both regular artillery batteries, 
the Confederates came under heavy fire. Evans requested support and the 2nd and 3rd Brigade 
moved in to reinforce the defensive line on Matthews Hill. McDowell sensed that the 
Confederates stiffened their resistance and he ordered the 1st Division of Tyler to force a 
breakthrough at the Stone Bridge. Just north of the bridge was the unguarded crossing of Farm 
Ford. The 3rd Brigade under the command of Col. William T. Sherman (1820 –1891) resolutely 
crossed the creek and advanced towards the Confederate positions on Matthews Hill from the 
east.213 
The Confederate troops came under attack from the west and east, and at 11:30 a.m., 
they were ordered to retreat eastwards to positions on the western slopes of Henry House Hill. 
As the Confederate line collapsed, panic spread among the men, resulting in a disorderly and 
chaotic retreat. The only four Confederate artillery pieces positioned on Henry House Hill 
provided a ferocious cover fire for the regrouping infantry units. Around the same time, the 4th 
(and last) Brigade of Johnston’s army arrived by train at Manassas-Junction. 214  By now 
McDowell’s objectives were clear and Johnston was the first to recognise the tactical importance 
of Henry House Hill for the Confederate defence. Johnston’s Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson 
(1824 –1863) had already positioned his 1st Brigade on the ‘false crest’ out of sight behind the top 
of the Hill.215 The cavalry, under the command of Col. James Ewell Brown Stuart was positioned 
on the Confederate left flank, ready to spring into action at the foot of Bald Hill. 
By 2:00 p.m., the battle was concentrated on the western slopes of Henry House Hill and 
McDowell ordered his troops to press the attack, outnumbering the Confederate defenders on 
the Hill two-to-one. McDowell’s attack was supported by his valued regular artillery units, who 
were positioned southwest of the Union line of attack. Clad in blue uniforms, the Confederate 
33rd Virginia Infantry regiment counterattacked and advanced on the Union artillery position. 
Tragically, the Union infantry units supporting the two regular artillery units held their fire as the 
Confederate regiment approached, mistakenly identifying their blue uniforms for Union soldiers. 
The Virginians opened a close-range volley of musket fire with devastating effect on the Union 
infantry and artillery units. Surprised and struck by panic, the south western part of the Union 
line fell in disarray. At this moment the Confederate cavalry regiment of Col. Stuart spring into 
action and smashed into the retreating Union soldiers.216 
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The Union troops regrouped, counter attacked and retook their positions, but it was too 
late. By now Confederate reinforcements arrived and pressed on from the southeast, Johnston’s 
4th Brigade from Manassas-Junction and Beauregard’s 6th Brigade from Blackburn’s Ford. To the 
northeast on Henry House Hill, Brig. Gen. ‘Stonewall’ Jackson spurred his men on to attack: 
‘Reserve your fire until they come within fifty yards! Then fire and give them the bayonet! And then you charge, yell 
like furies’. The Union line was pushed from the plateau back to the foot of Henry House Hill. 
McDowell’s attack was falling apart as Union troops retreated hastily over the Stone Bridge 
along the Warrenton Turnpike and back in the direction of Sudley Springs.217 
The sudden retreat of the Union forces was further worsened by hundreds of spectators 
who had left Washington for a family’s day out.218 The defeat of the numerically superior Union 
army was a shock to the nation; an estimated 12,000 Union soldiers lost their regiments in the 
chaos of the ensuing retreat.219 The Union Army of Northeastern Virginia had 460 dead, 1,124 
wounded and 1,312 missing; the Confederates had 387dead, 1,582 wounded and 13 missing. It 
was an important victory for the South, which strengthened the belief in- and support for the 
Confederate cause of secession.220 
 
 
3.2 The infantry tactics of the First Bull Run 
The first major engagement of the Civil War had been fought along the lines of the basic tactical 
concepts employed in the Mexican-American War. For example, open order tactics only saw 
limited use at Bull Run in comparison to closed order tactics. Indeed, light infantry advanced in 
open order formations, providing aimed cover fire for the line infantry advancing in columns 
before deploying in two rank line formations to engage the enemy. The massed line infantry used 
controlled volleys of musket fire; however, at close range, these volleys of fire had more shock 
value than causing actual physical damage.221 
 The Union troops struggled on their march towards Centreville. Union Col. Sherman 
commented, ‘The march demonstrated little save the general laxity of discipline; for with all my personal efforts 
I could not prevent the men from straggling for water, blackberries, or anything on the way they fancied.’ and ‘We 
had good organization, good men, but no cohesion, no real discipline, no respect for authority, no real knowledge of 
war.’222 The rolling terrain at Bull Run provided the Confederates with strong defensive positions, 
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but also made it more difficult to quickly bring troops into position. Nevertheless, the 
Confederates managed to position themselves in front of the flank attack of the Union troops at 
Matthews Hill and Henry House Hill.223 
The Union commanders made use of the rolling terrain to conceal their movements; Col. 
Sherman successfully advanced from Farm Ford and attacked the Confederates from behind on 
Matthews Hill. Historian Wayne Hsieh classifies this as a ‘reasonable good sign of battlefield 
competence’.224 However, the Confederate commanders were just as apt. Brig. Gen. Jackson had 
positioned his troops behind the top of Henry House Hill, concealing them from the advancing 
enemy on the slopes. The Confederates awaited the Union troops to arrive over the top of the 
hill. Mahan had warned of the risks of advancing over the top of a hill: ‘If the crest of a hill intervenes 
in a pursuit, it should be gained with great caution, for fear of coming suddenly upon the enemy in force on the 
opposite side.’225 
The Union troops had already been mostly armed with the rifled-musket, which gave 
them more than triple the range of the Confederate troops, who were mostly armed with 
smoothbore-muskets. There is, however, no evidence of Union troops using the increased range 
effectively to their advantage. The Union Col. William B. Franklin reported afterwards ‘that a 
great deal of the misfortune … is due to the fact that our troops knew very little of the principles and practice of 
firing … the rear files sometimes firing into and killing the front ones’.226 A partial explanation for the poor 
aiming by the Union troops was that their rifled-muskets were sighted for three-hundred yards 
(274 metres), so at close-range soldiers would fire over the heads of their targets.  
Johnston concluded afterwards that the Confederate soldiers had been more accurate in 
their fire: ‘Our men require less instruction in shooting than in any other military exercise.’ However, he 
admitted in a report to President Davis that it was probably ‘the consequence more of excitement than of 
want of skill.’ However, the general opinion on both sides was that Southern white men were 
traditionally better shots, and ‘it is one of our great advantages over the Northern people’.227 
Still, accurate aiming was not decisive for the outcome of the battle. Rather it was the 
Confederate advantage of the defensive position, their ability to actively reinforce and stabilise 
their line as exemplified by Brig. Gen. ‘Stonewall’ Jackson.  Griffith concludes that the 
Confederate command employed a mobile- or active concept of operations. 228  The tactical 
flexibility of the Confederate commanders ensured that troops from unengaged sectors along the 
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original line of battle could be directed to Henry House Hill and repel the Union flanking 
manoeuvre.  
While the theory behind McDowell’s battle plan was not inherently wrong, the majority 
of his troops lacked the level of proficiency and experience to successfully execute the complex 
flanking manoeuvres. Moreover, the regular officers were not evenly dispersed among the 
irregular troops. Many regular Union officers were forced to leave their divisional and brigade 
duties to take direct command of their troops, like Col. Burnside who had to take direct 
command of the irregulars in order to speed up the deployment at the foot of Matthews Hill.229 
While the Confederate soldiers were just as inexperienced, their response to McDowell’s 
manoeuvres were less demanding, such as holding the line and repelling the attackers. Indeed, 
the Confederate commanders did not dare to pursue the fleeing Union army and expose their 
troops to more complex movements.230 
The First Battle of Bull Run also saw the first effective use of a signals organisation – 
wig-wag flags, deployed by the Confederate command. This system of communication proved 
valuable when the chief signal officer Capt. Alexander could warn Col. Evans of McDowell’s 
flanking manoeuvre. 231  While the tactical importance is questionable, Hagerman notes that 
Beauregard ordered his troops to entrench their positions and prepare for a melee fight with 
fixed bayonets, including the light infantry. According to Hagerman, Beauregard thereby 
challenged the conventions of the tactical offensive since its success in Mexico.232 In contrast, 
Griffith does not find the tactical decision to construct field fortifications of such great 
importance for the course of battle, as ultimately the outcome was not decided along 
Beauregard’s extensive line of defence but at Matthews Hill and Henry House Hill.233 
 
 
3.3 The Battle of Antietam September 17, 1862 
According to historian John Keegan, during the second half of 1862, the character of the Civil 
War suddenly transformed into a ‘much more serious, bitter, and hard-fought [war] than that of the first 
year’.234 On August 28, 1862, the Union and Confederate forces engaged each other for the 
second time at Manassas-Junction. The Second Battle of Bull Run ‘was a much fiercer encounter than 
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the first, evidence of how much both sides had learned in thirteen months of fighting’. 235  The Union and 
Confederate soldiers were no longer easily shaken by the experiences on the battlefield. 
Compared to the chaotic retreat after the First Battle of Bull Run, the Union troops now 
retreated ‘reasonably orderly’.236 Since the Seven Days Battles from June 25 to July 1 1862, ‘both 
Union and Confederate forces were reasonably competent in terms of tactics on the brigade and regimental levels 
and had at the very least adequate march-discipline and reasonably good unit cohesion.’237 
After the defeat of the Union at the Second Bull Run, the federal capital came under 
threat of the Confederate ‘Army of Northern Virginia’ commanded by the famous General 
Robert E. Lee (1807 –1870). The defence of Washington came in the hands of Maj. Gen. 
George B. McClellan (1826 –1885) and the Union ‘Army of the Potomac’.238 After the Second 
Bull Run, the Confederates seized the initiative, General Lee wrote to President Jefferson Davis: 
‘We cannot afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponent in men and military equipments, must 
endeavor to harass, if we cannot destroy them’.239 On September 4, Lee ordered his army to cross the 
Potomac River into Maryland. 240  As he advanced into the North, Lee forced McClellan to 
respond to his movements. Moreover, Lee could relieve his battered home state Virginia and a 
victory on northern territory could generate foreign recognition for the Confederate cause.241 
On 9 September, Lee separated his army and with ‘Special Order No. 191, ordered the II 
Corps of Maj. Gen. ‘Stonewall’ Jackson to move southwest and capture the strategically located 
Union arsenal at Harpers Ferry. The I Corps of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet (1821 –1904) was 
ordered to move west and investigate rumours of state militia activity in Boonsboro and 
Hagerstown. The II Corps Division of Lt. Gen. D.H. Hill was ordered to Fredericktown to 
secure the rear guard of Jackson and Longstreet.242 On 13 September, McClellan was informed 
about Lee’s movements; Union soldiers had found a copy of Special Order No. 191 in an 
abandoned Confederate encampment. However, McClellan neglected to act decisively on the 
opportunity to defeat the dispersed Army of Northern Virginia and Lee was informed the next 
day about the intelligence leak, ordering Hill’s Division to form a defensive line along three 
passes of the South Mountain to slow down the pursuing Army of the Potomac.243 
Meanwhile, Lee considered aborting the Maryland campaign and ordered the I Corps of 
Longstreet to retreat west and await Jackson’s return from Harpers Ferry in the town of 
                                                          
235 Ibid: 164. 
236 Hsieh, The Old Army in War and Peace: 280. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Keegan, The American Civil War: 164-165. 
239 Eicher, The Longest Night: 336. 
240 Keegan, The American Civil War: 167. 
241 Eicher, The Longest Night: 336-337. 
242 Ibid: 338-339. 
243 Ibid: 340-341. 
50 
 
Sharpsburg. On September 15, news reached Lee that the small defence force could no longer 
hold back the Army of the Potomac at South Mountain, but also that Jackson had captured 
Harpers Ferry. Strengthened by the news of Jackson’s success, Lee ordered defensive positions 
set up along the Antietam Creek, east of Sharpsburg. The position with which Lee chose to face 
McClellan was according to historian David J. Eicher, ‘tactically a questionable one’. 244  While 
according to Paddy Griffith: ‘He [Lee] adopted a well-conceived position in depth around Sharpsburg, 
although it had weaknesses due to the proximity of the River Potomac in the rear and the searching batteries of 
enemy rifled artillery on the heights in front.’245 
Still, the Confederate supply lines were restricted to the only crossing of the River, 
Boteler’s Ford southwest of Sharpsburg, which was also the only escape route.246 The Antietam 
Creek itself offered little defence as there were three bridge crossings near Sharpsburg: the 
Upper Bridge to the northeast, the Middle Bridge directly to the east and the Rohrbach Bridge to 
the southeast of the town.247 The Rohrbach Bridge was the only crossing over the Antietam 
Creek which was within rifle range of the Confederate line of defence.248 Confined in between 
the two waterways, the battlefield was only two square miles (3.2 kilometres).  
Overlooking the Cornfield northeast of Sharpsburg, the Confederate left was 
concentrated in and around the West Woods and the small Dunker Church, ironically the prayer 
house of a German pacifist sect. The centre line of defence was directly east of Sharpsburg, 
concentrated around a sunken road (afterwards known as Bloody Lane) in front of the Middle 
Bridge. The right line of defence was concentrated southeast of Sharpsburg, in front of the 
Rohrbach Bridge.249 The Confederate soldiers were not entrenched but used the cover provided 
by the terrain, such as elevations in the rolling farmland, stonewalls and small clusters of trees.250 
On 15 September, McClellan slowly moved his 75,316 troops251 in position; in the morning Lee’s 
forces had only consisted of Longstreet’s I Corps, 19,000 strong. Some 11,000 troops of 
Jackson’s II Corps would not arrive from Harpers Ferry until the afternoon, in addition to the 
10,000 troops left behind to oversee the surrender of the Union garrison.252 
Finally on 17 September at dawn, McClellan ordered his troops into battle. His battle 
plan was to concentrate three army corps’ on the left of the Confederate defensive line while the 
large IX Corps of Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside was ordered to create a diversion on the 
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Confederate right. In addition, four Union divisions and cavalry were held in reserve to exploit 
any possible breakthroughs on the Confederate centre and right. McClellan expected Burnside to 
draw away the attention from the Confederate left and if he had the opportunity to breakthrough 
and cross the Rohrbach Bridge, Burnside could attack the Confederate right flank and roll up 
their entire line of defence. In theory, McClellan could achieve the objective given to him by 
President Lincoln ‘to destroy the rebel army’.253 
Under the command of Maj. Gen. Joseph ‘Fighting Joe’ Hooker, the I Corps led the 
attack against the Confederate left. Hooker was able to drive the Confederate soldiers of 
Jackson’s II Corps back from the West Woods and the Cornfield. Around Dunker Church, 
Union soldiers had penetrated the Confederate lines, but Lee responded accordingly, sending 
reinforcements from quiet sectors on his centre and right to counterattack. Hooker’s I Corps 
was shattered before the Union’s XII Corps, part of the second attack wave, could support 
them. The XII Corps advanced even further behind the Confederate lines around Dunker 
Church, but without support they were unable to follow through. Like the I Corps before them, 
the XII Corps was repelled by the Confederate defenders and suffered heavy losses.254 
The third attack wave was led by a division of Maj. Gen. ‘Bull’ Sumner’s II Corps, 
advancing through the Confederate lines in the West Woods.255 Again Lee responded, sending 
two divisions to counterattack the II Corps, one arriving just in time from Harpers Ferry and 
another from the Confederate right near Rohrbach Bridge. Sumner’s division was obliterated 
from the rear, flank and front. The battle on the Confederate left had now raged for five hours 
and 12,000 men256 were already lying wounded or dead on the battlefield. The fighting was so 
ferocious that five Union and five Confederate divisions, which had already suffered too many 
losses, disengaged in mutual consent.257 
During the midday, two fresh Union divisions of Sumner’s II Corps were ordered to 
concentrate their attack on the centre of the Confederate line of defence. The attack succeeded 
as the Confederate soldiers were unable to withstand the superior numbers; their lines were 
shattered and the Confederate centre was wide open. However, McClellan had lost his resolve, 
shaken by the defeat of three of his army Corps’ and, worried that Lee could mount yet another 
counterattack on the centre, he kept his fresh VI Corps in reserve. The Confederate centre fell 
silent and a tactical opportunity was lost, while the fighting on the Confederate right increased.258 
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On the Confederate right, a Georgian brigade had stubbornly defended the crossing at 
Rohrbach Bridge against Burnside’s IX Corps. From behind trees and a stone wall, the 
Georgians picked off the exposed Union troops trying to cross the bridge one-by-one. In the 
early afternoon, two Union regiments, suffering heavy losses, finally secured the bridgehead. 
When the Confederate positions at ‘Burnside’s Bridge’ fell, it became clear that Burnside could 
have sent his main force through the fordable crossing south of the bridge instead of desperately 
trying to cross the bridge. Well in the afternoon, three of Burnside’s divisions forced the 
Confederate right flank back to Sharpsburg, threatening to cut off the only Confederate escape 
route over the Potomac at Boteler’s Ford.259 
Despite Burnside’s progress, McClellan was still worried about Lee’s ability to 
counterattack. Therefore McClellan also ordered the V Corps, intended to support any 
breakthrough by Burnside, to stay in reserve in addition to the VI Corps. As Lee witnessed his 
right flank falling apart, another Confederate division from Harpers Ferry arrived. The division 
under the command of Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill crossed the Boteler’s Ford and charged into the left 
flank of Burnside’s attack. The Confederate counterattack surprised the Union troops as Hill’s 
men wore captured Union uniforms, causing four Union regiments to hold their fire before 
realising they faced the enemy. The tables were turned and the Union attack on the Confederate 
right began to unravel; the Union forces had failed to sustain their attacks along the Confederate 
line after successful breakthroughs.260 
That night at Lee’s headquarters, exhausted Confederate corps and division commanders 
reported that several brigades had lost fifty per cent or more of their men. Scarcely 30,000 
Confederate soldiers had survived through the day unscathed. Nevertheless, Lee decided to 
remain in position the following day. Despite the arrival of two fresh Union divisions on the 
morning of 18 September, McClellan dared not to renew his attack. As darkness fell on the 
second day of the tactical stalemate, Lee ordered his troops to retreat. Lee’s Maryland campaign 
abruptly ended and McClellan had gained a minor strategic victory by averting a Confederate 
intrusion of the North.261 
Still, McClellan had failed to coordinate his attack waves accordingly while his troops 
penetrated the Confederate lines, supporting divisions came too late and opportunities to exploit 
the breakthroughs of the Confederate line were lost. According to Griffith, the Union attack was 
‘no better coordinated than it had been at First Manassas.’262  The Army of the Potomac had 2,010 dead, 
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9,416 wounded and 1,042 missing of the 38,000 men sent unto the battlefield. Lee had about 
2,700 dead, 9,024 wounded and 2,000 missing. In total the massacre at Antietam had left about 
4,810 men dead on the battlefield.263 
 
 
3.4 The infantry tactics of Antietam 
At the battle of Antietam, Hagerman argues, McClellan had broken with his previous pattern of 
entrenching his positions, thereby suggesting that he found himself in tactically uncharted 
territory when he was ordered to take the offensive and destroy Lee’s rebel army. McClellan 
lacked the confidence for a decisive offensive, for he had been more comfortable on the 
defensive, which resulted in a half-hearted attack at Antietam.264 Still he had a solid battle plan 
and a numerically superior force; therefore, it remains speculative why McClellan did not follow 
through. Perhaps McClellan lacked the confidence for a decisive attack because of his 
inexperience on the offensive or maybe he was simply intimidated by Lee’s ability to 
counterattack, or both.  
Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia had withstood a numerically superior and better 
supplied force. However, the sentiment among the Confederate soldiers afterwards was that, if 
Lee had ordered them to fortify their defensive positions, they would have suffered fewer 
casualties. While he did make tactical use of the rolling terrain concealing his troops, the 
outcome of the battle was decided by Lee’s ability to respond to McClellan’s attacks by shifting 
his troops from quiet sectors and by the reinforcements arriving from Harpers Ferry. 265 
McWhiney and Jamieson explain Lee’s counterattacks by his overall preference for the tactical 
offensive even when he was forced in the defensive.266 
Still Lee’s counterattacks were direct responses to McClellan’s movements and it is 
therefore questionable if Lee expressed a clear preference for the tactical offensive at Antietam. 
McClellan forced Lee’s hand by attacking him, but who in turn demonstrated an active tactical 
defensive in the same manner as Beauregard and Johnston had at Bull Run. Strengthened by the 
capture of Harpers Ferry and the relatively strong positions along the Antietam Creek, Lee saw 
an opportunity to challenge McClellan, despite him being outnumbered. Such tactical decisions 
and the desire to force a decisive victory would, according to historian Russell F. Weigeley, 
characterise Lee over the course of the war. Weigeley argues in his work, The American Way of 
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War, that ‘Lee was too Napoleonic. Like Napoleon himself, with his passion for the strategy of annihilation and 
the climatic, decisive battle as its expression, he destroyed in the end not the enemy armies, but his own.’267 
According to Hagerman, ‘the lessons of Antietam were certainly against the continuing use of open 
infantry assault tactics’.268 This may be true from the standpoint of the Union attackers, but it is not 
so from the standpoint of the Confederate defenders. If Lee had sacrificed mobility by ordering 
his troops to entrench and huddle together, the already outnumbered Confederate troops would 
have likely been unwilling to counterattack. At this stage of the Civil War, no clear tactical 
developments were revealed other than that both sides had shown an increasing aptitude in 
waging war. Or as Hsieh suggests, ‘the same process of halting improvement in military competence among 
both contending armies that had begun at the outbreak of hostilities in 1861. Since both sets of troops improved 
roughly at comparable rates, neither gained much of an advantage over the other on an organisational level’.269 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
267 Weigeley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1973: 127. 
268 Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: 56. 
269 Hsieh, The Old Army in War and Peace: 282. 
55 
 
Chapter 4 Gettysburg to Spotsylvania 1863 – 1864 
 
4.1 The Battle of Gettysburg July 1-3, 1863 
From the winter of 1862 until the late spring of 1863, the Confederacy had endured several 
Union offensives in attempt to capture the Confederate capital of Richmond. On 15 December 
1862, the campaign of the Army of the Potomac under the command of Maj. Gen. Burnside was 
halted by Lee at Fredericksburg, Virginia. The Union offensive was renewed in April 1863, now 
under the command of Maj. Gen. Hooker. On 6 May, Hooker’s army was defeated in the woods 
near Chancellorsville, Virginia; again Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia had averted a Union 
breakthrough in the eastern theatre.270 
Although Lee had won a succession of limited victories in Virginia, none of these had 
resulted in the definitive defeat of the Army of the Potomac. In the western theatre, Union 
offensive efforts had been more successful; on 18 May, the promising Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. 
Grant (1822 – 1885) laid siege on the city of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Three days earlier Lee had 
been called to Richmond to discuss the threat from the west with President Jefferson Davis and 
the Secretary of War James Seddon, and the still lingering Army of the Potomac in the north. 
Lee argued that in order to regain the strategic initiative, a Confederate campaign into northern 
territory was needed.271 
The strategic objectives differed little from those of the Confederate Maryland campaign 
which ended at Antietam in September 1862. A Confederate offensive on northern territory 
would relieve the pressure from war torn Virginia and the Army of Northern Virginia could live 
off the land. After Chancellorsville, the Army of the Potomac had positioned itself along the 
Rappahannock River and a Confederate offensive would force the Union army out of its 
defensive position. Finally, by achieving a victory, Lee still hoped to strengthen the position of 
the ‘Copperheads’, the Democratic Congressmen in favour of making peace with the 
Confederacy.272 
In the first week of June 1863, Lee ordered his Army of Northern Virginia to move into 
the Shenandoah Valley, as the morale of his well-supplied troops was high. Throughout June, 
both Union and Confederate armies engaged in strategic manoeuvres. The new commander of 
the Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade (1815 – 1872) reasoned that if he 
concentrated the Union forces, Lee would be compelled to attack him. As long as Lee’s objective 
was to destroy the Army of the Potomac, Meade could decide on what grounds. Meade ordered 
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his troops to march towards Big Pipe Creek, Virginia southeast of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania to 
set up defensive positions and draw Lee into a fight.  However, Lee was informed about the 
Union forces crossing the Potomac River and he decided to concentrate his forces near 
Gettysburg.273 
The sleepy Pennsylvanian town of Gettysburg, with only 2,390 residents274 was the centre 
of what would become the largest and bloodiest battle of the American Civil War.275 Gettysburg 
was built along crossroads on open rolling grasslands in the north, surrounded by wooden 
farmhouses. Among the wooden housing of the flourishing town, brick buildings had been built. 
On the northern edge of town, there was the Pennsylvania College on and the western edge, 
there was the Lutheran Theological Seminary. Both buildings had cupolas which would serve as 
observation posts during the battle.  
From the south western edge of town, a ridge stretched out to the southwest, known as 
Seminary Ridge. From the southern edge of town, another ridge stretched out to the south 
known as Cemetery Ridge.276 The northern end of Cemetery Ridge culminated into two hills, 
Cemetery Hill (153 meters) and Culp’s Hill (186 meters) slightly to the east. The southern end of 
Cemetery Ridge culminated into the joint hilltops of Little Round Top (200 meters) and Big 
Round Top (234 meters).277 The terrain on the north western front of the two hilltops was 
heavily wooded, littered by rock boulders and broken up by fields and fences. These killing fields 
would be known later as Devil’s Den, the Wheatfield and the Peach Orchard.278 
On 30 June, a Confederate foraging party stumbled on Union cavalry northwest of 
Gettysburg. The next morning, a sizeable Confederate force was sent to determine the size and 
strength of the encountered cavalry. The two Union cavalry brigades had taken up defensive 
positions and withstood the Confederate attack until the Union I Corps arrived under the 
command of Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds. After he assessed the situation, Reynolds decided that 
the Confederates, now advancing in strength, had to be prevented from reaching the high 
grounds south of Gettysburg. Reynolds was shot and killed during the counterattack against the 
Confederates now advancing from the west and north.279 
Meade had about 93,500 troops under his command, organised in seven smaller corps 
and consisting of infantry divisions, each with an attached artillery brigade, a cavalry corps and 
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artillery reserve.280 Lee advanced unto Gettysburg with about 70,200 troops, organised in three 
larger corps’, consisting of infantry divisions and each with an attached artillery battalion. In 
addition, each corps had an artillery reserve and a separate cavalry division.281 
When General Lee arrived at Gettysburg on 1 July, he found that the troops of the 
Union I Corps were positioned to the west, while the IX Corps was positioned to the north of. 
During the afternoon, the Union positions began to crumble under the Confederate attacks and 
Lee ordered Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell to attempt the capture of Cemetery Hill south of 
Gettysburg.282 Lee feared that if Meade arrived with his main force, the Union commander 
would order his troops to entrench Cemetery Hill. However, Ewell failed and as the first day of 
battle ended, Union troops of the I Corps and IX Corps established a defensive line south of 
Gettysburg on Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill.283 
During the night, both armies arrived in Gettysburg at full strength and concentrated 
their force on the opposite ridges, separated by a shallow valley, south of Gettysburg. On the 
morning of 2 July, the second day of the battle, the main Confederate force occupied Seminary 
Ridge and faced the main Union force to the east on Cemetery Ridge. Lee’s plan was to 
manoeuvre the I Corps south down Seminary Ridge before making a sharp turn to the north. 
From there the Confederates would advance against Meade’s left flank, rolling up the Union line 
of defence on Cemetery Ridge.284 
The commanding General James Longstreet of the I Corps reluctantly complied with the 
order of his superior and it was not until four in the afternoon before the I Corps began to 
move. That morning Longstreet had pleaded with Lee to disengage and not fight the battle on 
Meade’s terms, but Lee could not be convinced. As Longstreet ordered his divisions against the 
Union left flank, the division of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaw engaged the Union III Corps, which 
suffered heavy casualties in the Wheatfield and Peach Orchard. McLaw’s advance was finally 
halted by the V Corps of Maj. Gen. George Sykes; Meade had sent Sykes to support the left 
flank. The Confederate division of Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood failed to make the sharp turn to the 
north as Lee had planned. Instead Hood moved his division too far to the east and was pinned 
down by enemy fire at the foot of the Round Tops. Hood decided to press on and ordered his 
division to advance towards the Union positions at the Devil’s Den and Little Round Top.285 
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 Among the rock boulders of Devil’s Den, the fight intensified as the Confederate 
Alabaman and Texan regiments began advancing up the slopes to take Little Round Top. When 
captured, Little Round Top could become a Confederate artillery position, endangering the 
Union defensive line along Cemetery Ridge. Meade’s chief engineer recognised this danger, but 
as Meade was being informed, four regiments of the V Corps had already raced up the slopes. 
On his own initiative, Col. Strong Vincent ordered four regiments to take and hold Little Round 
Top. Both sides laid down sustained fire until their ammunition pouches were emptied. On the 
northern slopes, Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain of the 20th Maine regiment, decided that he had no 
choice but to order his men to fix their bayonets and charge down the hill.286 The 20th Maine 
captured three hundred dazed Confederate soldiers.287 
 During the second day at Gettysburg, Lee’s soldiers had failed to force a breakthrough 
on the Union left flank. At the Wheatfield and Peach Orchard, the Union III Corps of Maj. Gen. 
Daniel E. Sickles suffered heavy casualties, but held the line long enough until reinforcements of 
the V Corps arrived. While the Confederate brigades captured Devil’s Den and held the ground 
at the base of Big Round Top, their advance was halted.288 More importantly, the Union soldiers 
withstood the assault on Little Round Top and thereby denied Lee the artillery positions which 
could have seriously endangered Meade’s left flank.289 
 On the northeast of the Union defensive line, the soldiers defended their entrenched 
positions against Confederate attacks by Ewell’s II Corps, southeast of Gettysburg. During the 
second day, Meade was forced to send reinforcements to his left flank and as a result, the Union 
line in the northeast was dangerously thinned out. Yet Meade reasoned that on the third day of 
battle, Lee would attack the Union centre on Cemetery Ridge, for on the first day he had 
attacked the Union right and on the second day had attacked the left.290 
 The morning of 3 July was announced by Union artillery fire on the right flank of the 
Union defensive line where Union troops attacked trenches they had lost on the first day. 
Elsewhere no serious manoeuvres or attacks occurred that morning. As Meade had anticipated, 
Lee decided to attack the Union centre on Cemetery Ridge, led by the I Corps division of Lt. 
Gen. Pickett. Under the cover of the woods on Seminary Ridge, the Confederate soldiers tensely 
awaited the order to advance unto the open grasslands up the slopes of Cemetery Ridge. 
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Longstreet disagreed with Lee’s decision for a frontal assault against the Union centre and 
suggested to renew the attack on the Union left.291 
Lee persisted and seven minutes past one, Longstreet’s forty artillery batteries 
bombarded the Union artillery positions for two hours in anticipation of the infantry assault. 
After two hours, both sides had exchanged artillery fire without inflicting serious damage. Pickett 
asked Longstreet for permission to advance and the troops began moving, skirmishers in front 
followed by the line infantry. The Union and Confederate skirmishers exchanged fire until the 
former withdrew back to their defensive lines. As the Confederate troops charged over the top 
of the ridge, the Union batteries fired canister shots into the advancing mass, literally obliterating 
the Confederate soldiers. Under heavy musket fire, the Confederate soldiers charged with fixed 
bayonets into the Union defenders. During their advance, the Confederates had sustained heavy 
casualties and were forced to retreat; ‘Pickett’s Charge’ on Cemetery Ridge had failed.292 
Lee’s final attack and last chance to turn the tide of battle in his favour had failed and he 
was forced to retreat from Gettysburg, ending the Confederate campaign on enemy territory.293 
The Confederate soldiers paid a high price for Lee’s offensive. Of the 70,274 soldiers engaged in 
battle, 4,637 were killed, 12,391 were wounded, and 5,846 went missing, more likely the 
Confederate losses totalled 28,000. Meade had committed 93,534 soldiers to combat, 3,149 were 
killed, 14,503 were wounded, and 5,161 went missing. In total, 163,808 soldiers engaged in 
combat at Gettysburg, from which around twenty eight per cent, some 45,687 men were killed, 
wounded or went missing. The Union had won an important strategic victory at Gettysburg, as 
the Confederacy could not afford another offensive into northern territory.294 
 
 
4.2 The infantry tactics of Gettysburg 
The Confederate attackers at Gettysburg advanced at double-quick time in close-order 
formations, nevertheless rapid advancements could not compensate their losses by rifled-musket 
fire. Moreover, the Confederate soldiers could not sustain the double quick-time for prolonged 
distances; afterwards their officers reported that their men fatigued and were unable to reach 
their objectives. While this was sometimes used as an excuse, it was more than often a serious 
problem which was also reported during the First Battle of Bull Run. Back then it was attributed 
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to a lack of discipline and experience, but at Gettysburg it had been the Confederate veterans 
who struggled.  
As McWhiney and Jamieson illustrate, ‘Maj. George H. Hildt said the Thirtieth Ohio became 
‘utterly exhausted’ when it crossed a ploughed field at Sharpsburg at ‘double quick time’. When the Fifth 
Alabama came into battle on July 1, 1863, at Gettysburg by advancing ‘frequently at a run’ across mixed 
terrain, many of its soldiers fainted from exhaustion.’295 After the second day of fighting, an officer of 
Hood's Division reported, ‘We were repulsed the first charge, because the men were completely exhausted 
when they made it, having double-quicked a distance of some 400 yards, under a severe shelling and a 
scorching.’ 296  At Gettysburg, the exhaustion was attributed to the hot and humid weather; in 
general soldiers were ordered to drop their full campaign gear before a battle or charge.297 
The heavy Confederate losses were the result of Lee’s plan to attack Meade’s strong 
defensive positions three days in a row, a foreign observer noted: ‘The plan of attack seems to have 
been very simple.’298On the third day Meade had expected Lee to attack his centre; therefore, Union 
troops had not been shifted from the centre to weaker sectors of the line. While Griffith reminds 
us that the rifled-muskets used by the attackers and defenders still ‘fell a long way short of perfection’, 
technical difficulties of loading the rifled-musket still persisted, misfires and poor aiming further 
contributed to the ineffectiveness.299 Whether rifled-musket fire was relatively ineffective or not, 
massed volleys of fire still had a devastating impact on advancing attackers at Gettysburg. Lee 
had clearly misjudged the outcome of his attacks on the second day and even more on the third 
day, exemplified by Pickett’s charge. In hindsight Lt. Gen. Longstreet was right when he advised 
his stubborn commander to disengage and draw Meade out of his defensive positions and from 
the high ground around Gettysburg.  
Once the positions around Gettysburg were taken, it was clear that Meade’s line of 
defence had left little gaps for Lee to exploit. Adequate response on the second day of the battle 
by Meade’s commanders closed the last gaps in the line at Peach Orchard and Little Round Top. 
Lee could not acquire a foothold to pry Meade’s troops from their positions; a crucial tactical 
opportunity to capture high grounds already failed on the first day as the II Corps under the 
command of Lt. Gen. Ewell had shown no persistence to capture Culp’s Hill.300 
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4.3 The Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse May 8-21, 1864 
On 4 July 1863, the day after the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, Union Maj. Gen. Grant 
captured Vicksburg. Still, the Confederacy was not defeated during the summer of 1863 and it 
would take a ‘relentless reduction of his [Lee’s] fighting numbers’301 by the hand of General-in-Chief 
Grant to deprive the Southern men of their conviction to fight for belief in the Confederate 
cause.302 The morale among the veteran troops of the Army of Northern Virginia remained high 
and General Lee summarised the Confederate predicament as follows: ‘If victorious, we have 
everything to hope for in the future. If defeated, nothing will be left for us to live’.303 
After Gettysburg, President Lincoln urged Maj. Gen. Meade to pursue and destroy the 
Army of Northern Virginia, but like McClellan after Antietam, Meade lacked the resolve to do 
so.  During the night of 13 July, Lee withdrew his army across the Potomac River and after 
Meade allowed Lee to cross the Rappahannock River, he halted his pursuit and positioned the 
Army of the Potomac along a tributary. It would not be until 3 May 1864 that the Army of the 
Potomac would cross the Rapidan River and embark on the Overland campaign.304 
During the spring of 1864, President Lincoln appointed Ulysses S. Grant General-in-
Chief. While Meade remained the acting commander, Grant directed the strategic objectives and 
attached his headquarters to the Army of the Potomac. In addition, Grant orchestrated the 
operations of the other Union armies, appointing Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman commander of 
the armies in the west and Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan commander of the cavalry in the eastern 
theatre.305 
Grant’s strategic plan did not revolve solely around the capture of Richmond; he planned 
coordinated advances on different fronts to prevent the Confederate armies from reinforcing 
each other. Meade’s objective was to engage Lee’s army. Sherman’s objective was to engage 
Johnston’s army in the west and to move far into the enemy interior to tear up the Confederate 
hinterland and deprive them of their taste for fighting.306 The Confederacy had lost northern 
Virginia as a strategic buffer, and after Vicksburg, its operational lines were severed by Union 
campaigns in the Confederate interior.307 
The Union and Confederate armies had wintered only a few miles apart from each other 
on opposite sides of the Rapidan; Grant had prepared to cross the river and position his army 
against Lee’s right flank. Grant did not underestimate his direct adversary; Lee would not expose 
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his army in an open field to Grant’s superior numbers. Lee decided not to contest the river 
crossing; instead he planned to hit the Army of the Potomac in the flank as they marched 
through the heavily wooded Wilderness where their superiority in numbers (115,000 against 
64,000) was less an advantage than in the open.308 
On 5 May, the Confederate II Corps approached from the west and ran into the Union 
V Corps moving south away from the Rapidan. However, Lee had been awaiting the arrival of 
Longstreet’s I Corps and was therefore forced to engage the 70,000 Union troops with fewer 
than 40,000 Confederates. Lee knew that the dense undergrowth of the Wilderness would make 
his lesser numbers more mobile while the Union masses would struggle. The Wilderness turned 
into a vicious fight; the thick smoke lingered in the woods hindering the visibility. The fight 
among the trees was further worsened by artillery shells, which had set the undergrowth on fire. 
The fighting concentrated around two intersections, which Grant needed to hold in order to 
continue on his march south.309 
The limited visibility of the terrain caused the loss of one of Lee’s best generals, James 
Longstreet. During the battle, Longstreet was wounded by friendly fire. Ironically in May 1863, 
during the Battle of Chancellorsville, Lt. Gen. Stonewall Jackson was fatally wounded by friendly 
fire in the same woodlands.310 After two days, the fighting died down and both sides conceded to 
a temporary stalemate. Of the some 100,000 Union soldiers engaged in the battle, 2,246 were 
killed, 12,037 were wounded and 3,383 went missing.  On the Confederate side, out of the 
60,000 engaged, the estimated losses were between 7,750 and 11,400.311 These high casualty rates 
compelled previous Union commanders on the offensive to retreat behind the nearest river. 
However, Grant had promised Lincoln that: ‘whatever happens, there will be no turning back.’312 For 
the first time during a campaign in Virginia, the Army of the Potomac would stay on the 
offensive after its initial battle.313 
Grant had hoped to avoid fighting in the woodlands and lure Lee to the open field. Lee, 
however, decided to make his stand from behind his fortified positions in the Wilderness and, 
after three days of relentless fighting, Grant ordered to disengage and manoeuvre around Lee’s 
fortified positions.314 On both sides the battle had lacked direction and coordination. Without a 
clear strategy behind their attacks, the fighting remained indecisive, which was largely dictated by 
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the physical limitations of fighting in the dense woodlands. Lee had halted the Union advance 
through the woods of the Wilderness, but he had not stopped the Overland campaign.315 
On 7 May,  both armies exchanged random fire and Grant prepared plans to march 
around the Confederate right and take the crossroads near the town of Spotsylvania, about 
twelve miles (19 kilometres) to the south. If his plan succeeded, Grant would position himself 
between Lee and Richmond, forcing Lee to attack him or retreat.316 During the night of 7 May, 
the Army of the Potomac marched towards their new objective. While the Union soldiers were 
certain to face more savage fighting, Grant’s tenacity was more encouraging than the lethargic 
attitude of their former commanders.317 
Grant had ordered Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick of the VI Corps and Maj. Gen. Gouverneur 
K. Warren of the V Corps to march toward the crossroads of the Spotsylvania Courthouse. 
Meanwhile the crossroads were secured by Union cavalry awaiting the reinforcements, but in the 
early morning of 8 May, the Union V Corps collided with the Confederate I Corps of Lt. Gen. 
Anderson. He had spurred Anderson to race towards the crossroads as Lee had recognised their 
tactical importance.318 
Facing north, the Confederate line spread out over a mile from west to east, northwest of 
Spotsylvania. The Confederate II Corps had reinforced the right flank and during the night the 
Confederates fortified their positions. Constructing two lines of entrenchments but lacking 
spades, the Confederates loosened the earth with their hands, bayonets and cups. The line was 
further reinforced with abatis; the branches became a crude form of barbed wire.319 The I Corps 
was positioned along Laurel Hill. The II Corps held the Confederate right, fortified in a position 
in the shape of a Mule Shoe, a rounded and wooded elevation facing all surrounding directions. 
Furthermore, the III Corps under Lt. Gen. Jubal Early held the Confederate right line of defence 
stretching from the Mule Shoe in the north to the southwest in front of the crossroads of 
Spotsylvania.  
All in all, the entire Confederate line of defence was shaped in a reversed V, pointing to 
the northwest. On 9 May, the Union forces amassed near the Confederate lines. Warren faced 
the Confederate left and Union Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock positioned himself to turn the 
left flank. Burnside approached from the northeast, advancing towards the Confederate right 
secured by Early. Meanwhile, Lee had sent skirmishing parties to harass the approaching Union 
troops. A Confederate sharpshooter aimed and shot the Union General Sedgwick below the left 
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eye over a distance of one-thousand yards (914 metres) and moments earlier Sedwick’s worried 
staff officers had urged him to take cover, to which he had replied, ‘they couldn’t hit an elephant at 
this distance.’320 
During the afternoon of 9 May, Hancock moved towards the exposed left of Lee, but as 
darkness fell, the attack was called off. The danger of the exposed left had been recognised by 
Lee, who had ordered the division under Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, to leave Early’s III Corps and 
position itself on the Confederate left flank.321 On 10 May, Grant planned a frontal assault along 
the Confederate defensive line. Lee positioned his artillery along his line of defence and as the 
amassed Union troops charged towards the Confederate lines, their formations were shattered by 
artillery fire. Maj. Gen. Wright assigned a special assault force under the command of Col. 
Emory Upton to break through the fortified lines on the Mule Shoe.322 
Upton, a ‘young and intensely professional West Pointer’,323 picked twelve regiments, formed 
into four lines and he instructed his men to fix their bayonets and to hold their fire until they 
were on top of the enemy trenches.324 Charging across two-hundred yards (183 metres) of open 
ground and moving through the abatis, they breached the first line of entrenchments, 
immediately spreading left and right to widen the gap. The second assault line rushed past the 
first, towards the second line of entrenchments some hundred yards (91 metres) further. The 
third and fourth assault lines rounded up thousands of stunned Confederate prisoners.325 
Upton’s assault force crossed the defensive lines and penetrated into the heart of the 
enemy position. The Confederate line on the Mule Shoe was wide open for Wright’s supporting 
division to pour in and carry the momentum of Upton’s dashing assault. Sadly they arrived too 
late as Lee had time to aim his artillery at the approaching divisions, which were shattered in 
their advance. While Upton’s tactics had proven to be successful, the coordination with the 
supporting division failed.326 The Confederate counterattack that followed, forced Upton’s men 
to fall back and, by nightfall, Upton had lost a quarter of his men. Nevertheless, he was awarded 
a battlefield promotion and proposed that Grant apply the same tactics on a corps, backed by 
follow-up attacks all along the line.327 
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On 11 May, the fifth day of battle, Grant made plans to launch another massed frontal 
assault against the Mule Shoe the next morning.328 However, Lee expected another flank attack 
the next day and had withdrawn his artillery in order to swiftly meet such a threat.329 During the 
night, heavy rains ceased and on the morning of 12 May, the battlefield was cloaked in fog. The 
Confederate soldiers huddled in their entrenchments on the Mule Shoe and could not spot 
enemy movements. Instead they heard the approaching Union mass and requested the return of 
the artillery to their position. It was too late; Hancock’s II Corps and Wright’s VI Corps charged 
into the Confederate line as attackers and defenders amassed in the entrenchments on the Mule 
Shoe.330 
Both sides were caught in savage fighting; once fired, the rifles and muskets became 
clubs and spears. The concentrated mass of Union soldiers became uncontrollable and a 
counterattack drove them back to the edge of the Confederate lines. The firestorm and 
subsequent melee fight on the Mule Shoe raged for eighteen hours, well into the evening. Union 
soldiers settled in the outer line of defence of what was afterwards known as the Bloody Angle. 
During the fight on the Mule Shoe, additional Union attacks on the Confederate left and right 
had been repelled.331 
From 5 May through 12 May, the Army of the Potomac lost some 32,000 men as they 
were either killed, wounded, or missing; a total greater than for all Union armies combined in any 
previous week of the war. Lee's casualties were proportionately as high with about 18,000 men, 
including the devastating loss of twenty of fifty-seven corps, division and brigade commanders. 
Yet both sides were still able to make up for about half of their losses by calling in 
reinforcements.332 
On May 13, the ferocious fighting ceased as both sides recuperated. From 14 May to 17 
May both sides engaged in sporadic fighting and exchanged fire from their entrenchments. Lee 
extended the Confederate line of his III Corps further down south past Spotsylvania 
Courthouse.333 Grant shifted his front clockwise in order to force Lee from of his entrenched 
positions on Laurel Hill.  The Confederate line now stretched from behind the abandoned 
trenches and the mass grave of Bloody Angle in the northeast down to the southeast. Grant had 
ordered Hancock to the rear and Wright proposed to attack the Confederate left on 18 May at 
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dawn.334 However, Wright was repulsed and during the night of 19 May, Grant made plans to 
send Hancock further down south to end the stalemate at Spotsylvania Courthouse.335 
As Hancock moved south, Lee was forced to respond and the campaign entered a new 
phase. Of the 110,000 Union soldiers engaged at Spotsylvania, 17,500 casualties were reported. 
Lee had engaged 50,000 men and lost an unrecorded number, possibly around 10,000 men.336 
Grant had proven his determination to fight Lee to the bitter end. Grant had not been careless 
with the lives of his men, but he certainly had not spared them either.337 
The following months, Lee could not be tempted to attack Grant; instead Lee retreated 
to Petersburg where from June 1864 to March 1865, both adversaries were caught in a siege of 
First World War proportions. Meanwhile the Confederate hinterland had been gradually 
hollowed out by the Union operations of Generals William T. Sherman and Philip Sheridan, 
until Lee finally surrendered to Grant on April 9 1865 at the Appomattox Courthouse.338 
 
 
4.4 The infantry tactics of Spotsylvania Courthouse 
The battle at Spotsylvania Courthouse confirms Hagerman’s belief in the superiority of the 
tactical defensive during the Civil War. As Hagerman argues, the superiority of the tactical 
defensive was proven by Grant’s inability in the Wilderness as well as at Spotsylvania to 
overcome Lee’s fortified positions without suffering heavy losses. While Lee’s fortified positions 
ultimately failed to keep Grant’s army in position, it was only because Grant had relentlessly 
ordered his men in massed frontal assaults against fortified positions.339 
The assumption that Grant neglected offensive tactical manoeuvres to overcome Lee’s 
fortified positions is refuted by Hsieh, who points out that Grant ‘throughout the [Overland] 
campaign constantly attempted to turn Lee’s army’.340 Therefore it cannot be asserted that Grant only 
intended to overcome the Lee’s positions by blunt force. Still, Hsieh does agree with Hagerman 
that, ‘Grant did not have a systematic tactical outlook but rather acted according to an appraisal of each situation 
as it arose, blending an erratic mixture of common sense about the new conditions of warfare with predisposition to 
traditional tactics’.341 
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During the Overland campaign, the Civil War entered the final phase of tactical offensive 
warfare. Still, on a larger scale, clear tactical developments had failed to appear on the battlefield; 
Grant had never expressed an outspoken interest in the use of novel infantry tactics. In his 
memoirs, Grant described Hardee’s tactics as ‘nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age 
applied to Scott’s system. The commands were abbreviated and the movement expedited … I do not believe that 
officers of the regiment ever discovered that I had never studied the tactics that I used’.342 Grant’s disdain for 
Hardee’s tactical manual, in favour of a more general strategic overview, cannot be held against 
him in his role of General-in-Chief. Nevertheless, if he had shown more interest in the assault 
tactics developed by lower ranking officers closer to the heat of the battle, most notably Col. 
Emory Upton at Spotsylvania Courthouse, Grant may have regretted his neglect of more refined 
assault tactics.343 
During the Mexican-American War, the U.S. Army had successfully employed such 
assault tactics. At the Battle of Molino del Rey, an attack column of no more than five-hundred 
soldiers defeated the Mexican defenders as well as in the Battle of Chapultec, with two small 
attack columns each of two-hundred fifty soldiers.344 Grant was present during both battles and 
described the assault tactics in his memoires: ‘Two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, 
composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. They were commanded by Captains McKinzie and Casey 
respectively. The assault was successful, but bloody.’345 It is therefore surprising that Grant did not follow 
through on Upton’s example, still ordering a massed frontal assault the next day.  
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Chapter 5 The academic opinions concluded 
 
In their works, Edward Hagerman, Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson claim that the 
existing tactical doctrine was challenged during the Civil War by the arrival of the rifled-musket. 
As a consequence of the increased range and fire-rate, the prevalence of the post-Napoleonic 
tactical offensive shifted towards the tactical defensive. This doctrinal shift was expressed over 
the course of the war by an increased use of field fortifications. On the other hand, Paddy 
Griffith and Wayne Hsieh do not perceive the arrival of the rifled-musket of such great influence 
on the tactical doctrine and both dispute the claim that the Civil War saw an unprecedented use 
of field fortifications.  
Griffith refutes the importance of the rifled-musket as a tactical ‘game changer’ 
altogether and argues that the use of field fortifications was not born out of tactical necessity. 
Military theorists had needlessly propagated the use of field fortifications and the false sense of 
protection had a lethargic effect on the soldiers and officers. Otherwise, after the initial struggles 
of inexperience, Civil War armies would have demonstrated the same offensive tactics witnessed 
in the Napoleonic Wars and Mexican-American War.  
While Hsieh acknowledges the increased accuracy of the rifled-musket, he regards factors 
such as the level of proficiency and the morale of an army as far more decisive when determining 
whether offensive tactics succeeded or failed. 346  During the Civil War, neither side had a 
significant tactical advantage and both armies gained equal rates of proficiency. Moreover, both 
Union and Confederate senior officers shared the same training and combat experience, which 
made individual ‘military expertise’ even more important: ‘In the crucial eastern theatre, the average 
regiment in the Army of the Potomac fought as hard and as well as its Confederate regiments benefited from far 
superior brigade, division, corps, and army commanders’.347 
According to Hagerman, increased firepower of the rifled-musket affected the infantry 
doctrine by the increased use of field fortifications on the offensive as well as defensive. Military 
theorist Mahan had actively advocated the use of entrenchments by citizen-soldiers and that 
assault tactics were best left to regular soldiers. Therefore, during the Civil War, the mostly 
irregular troops were ordered into entrenchments by their commanders. The troops themselves 
actively pursued such defensive tactics because they experienced the increased firepower of the 
rifled-musket.348 
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Jamieson and McWhiney do not perceive such an early recognition of the tactical 
defensive by the American military. In the Mexican-American War, officers witnessed the 
success of assault tactics against Mexican field fortifications.349 Furthermore, until the Civil War, 
tactical theories had stressed that field fortifications could not withstand any frontal assault 
carried by ‘good’ troops.350 The officers in the Civil War, who had not witnessed the success of 
the tactical offensive in Mexico, were therefore the first to recognise the devastating effect of the 
rifled-musket fired from entrenchments.351 
 
The influence of the rifled-musket on the American battlefields must not be underestimated, but 
whether the rifled-musket was utilised to its full extent, thereby forcing the Union and 
Confederate soldiers into entrenchments, remains questionable. Joseph T. Glatthaar remarks 
that, based on Griffith’s own data,352 the average range of fire in Civil War battles was 127 yards 
(116 metres).353 It is important to note that this includes battles fought in heavily wooded areas, 
where ranges of fire would have been much shorter. Therefore Glatthaar concludes that the 
average range of fire on more open battlefields was probably well above 127 yards.  
If we recall, the accurate range of the smoothbore-musket was only around fifty or sixty 
yards (45 or 54 metres), while the rifled-musket, which had an effective range of between three 
and four hundred yards (247 and 365 metres), could kill from over one thousand yards354 (914 
metres). So it is safe to assume that, over time, Civil War soldiers attained a level of proficiency 
which allowed them to deliver accurate fire over greater distances not seen in previous conflicts.  
The increased firepower in terms of range and rate of fire had a minimal effect on the 
more complex assault tactics prescribed by the existing infantry doctrine. While such tactics were 
proven to be successful, they were tactical experiments and only executed by soldiers and 
officers on the lower levels of command. Assault tactics, as demonstrated by Emory Upton in 
the battle of Spotsylvania, were never brought into practice on a larger scale. The causes can be 
sought in the initial inability of the irregular troops to successfully execute such tactics as officers 
refrained from using them. In addition, the existing doctrine was never officially reviewed, so 
useful adjustments were not imposed from the top down. 
The spontaneous adjustments to assault tactics by soldiers themselves were defined by 
their limitations and common sense. A good example of this is the Battle of Fort Donelson (11-
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16 February, 1862). The brigade of Union Col. Morgan L. Smith, consisting of two Zouave 
regiments, advanced in a series of successive rushes, also known as the ‘Indian rush’. The reason 
for these successive rushes is rather interesting as these men were supposed to be in peak 
physical condition. After all, this is one of the virtues of the Zouave regiments. However, they 
fatigued during the assault and, in order to catch their breath, they advanced in successive rushes 
while sustaining their rate of fire. 
The Union Brig. Gen. Lew Wallace remarked, ‘indeed, purpose with them answered all the ends 
of alignment elbow to elbow…Now on the ground, creeping when the fire was hottest, running when it slackened, 
they gained ground with astonishing rapidity, and at the same rime maintained a fire that was like a sparkling of 
the earth. For the most part the bullets aimed at them passed over their heads and took effect in the ranks behind 
them.’355 
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What was the theoretical knowledge of warfare of the American commanding officer, how did he apply this 
knowledge on the battlefield and to what extent did he adjust these ideas during the course of the American Civil 
War? 
 
Conclusion 
The conceptual component, the tactical doctrine of the Union and Confederate infantry during 
the American Civil War was similar. Since the early-nineteenth century, the American infantry 
doctrine was based on French tactical thought. After the War of 1812 (1812 – 1815), the Board 
of Tactics, presided by Winfield Scott, developed a standardised infantry doctrine, based on the 
1791 French manual for infantry tactics. Scott made adjustments to the French manual by 
adopting the two-rank line formation and increasing the movement rates. Between 1815 and 
1825, the American regulations prescribed a significantly higher movement rate compared to the 
French professional standard. However, Scott revised his regulations in 1835, returning to lower 
movement rates in order to conform to the 1831 French manual for infantry tactics.356 Still, the 
interval of paces between files of the skirmish- and maximum order was further increased with 
the 1835 regulations.357 
Before returning to the more conservative French standards of 1831, the Board of 
Tactics increasingly explored the possibilities of swifter and more open-order infantry tactics. It 
remains, however, speculative why Scott and the Board at first deviated from the otherwise 
strictly followed French professional standard. Whether the reasoning behind Scott’s 
adjustments was based on perceived differences between the (more broken) American and 
European terrain, or rather finds its origins in the existing American military tradition is unclear. 
Fact remains that the American infantry doctrine emphasised an increased movement rate and 
more open order long before it would be dictated by the arrival of the rifled-musket. 
The development of a tactical doctrine by military and political reformers was part of a 
grander scheme to build a small professional U.S. Army, an expansible army maintained by a 
core of regular soldiers and officers in times of peace. However, the creation of a strong federal 
institution was met with political and public resentment, and while irregulars (militiamen and 
volunteers) remained an intrinsic part of the American military, the reformers persisted. A 
uniform organisational structure and core of regulars was established, armed with standardised 
weaponry and trained in the latest tactical fashion.  
During the decades of reform, after the War of 1812, a generation of regular officers was 
trained at the USMA; these officers would serve in the Mexican-American War (1846 – 1848) 
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and, over the course of time, form the senior command of the Union and Confederate military. 
Prior to the Civil War, the war against Mexico would be the only significant combat experience 
of these regular officers in conventional warfare. Ultimately their training and combat experience 
in Mexico undoubtedly influenced the warfare in the American Civil War.  
 The theoretical knowledge of these officers on warfare was both steeped in the virtues of 
the ‘tactical offensive’ as well as the ‘tactical defensive’. The virtues of the tactical offensive such 
as manoeuvrability, concentration of force and the belief in decisive victory, rose to prominence 
in early nineteenth century Europe as part of the Napoleonic legacy transferred to the United 
States. In the same period, American intellectual attention increased for the tactical defensive. 
The USMA, modelled after example of the École Polytechnique, emphasised civil and military 
engineering. At West Point, the military elite was introduced to the leading ideas of the Corps of 
Engineers and most notably of the most prominent early nineteenth century American military 
theorist, Professor Dennis Hart Mahan (1802 –1871).  
 Already before the arrival of the rifled-musket, Mahan advocated the relative advantage 
of irregular troops in the tactical defensive. The employment of field fortifications would address 
the shortcomings of irregular troops when pitched against regular troops. Moreover, the tactical 
defensive was more preferable because of the offensive limitations of irregular troops, most 
notably in the massed frontal assault. Still, Mahan did not disregard the tactical offensive as long 
as tactical manoeuvres such as the massed frontal assault were executed by regular troops. The 
theoretical ambivalence expressed by Mahan cannot be held against him; the American military 
still resided in a twilight-zone between the models of a mostly regular army and a mostly irregular 
army. Mahan had attempted to formulate an infantry doctrine, which could accommodate both 
army models. 
The Mexican-American War witnessed the success of the regular army and, while 
President Polk had intended to let the volunteers play a large military role, it was the regular army 
that triumphed in Mexico. The regular soldiers and officers had mastered the early nineteenth 
century tactical offensive and defeated a numerical superior enemy in hostile territory on the 
tactical defensive. After the Mexican-American War, the existing tactical doctrine was revised 
under the influence of technological advancements in weaponry, the arrival of the rifled-musket 
and widespread availability. This increased the tactical opportunities of long-range fire.  
The French combat experiences with the rifled-musket in colonial Africa led to the 
prominence of light infantry tactics. In 1855, the American officer William J. Hardee published 
his work Rifle and light infantry tactics, based on the tactical manual of the chasseurs à pied. Hardee’s 
manual was adopted by the Board as the official light infantry doctrine (and subsequently by the 
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Union and Confederate military). Moreover, the Board intended to include the line infantry in 
the application of Hardee’s manual, although the distinction between light and line infantry 
remained. 
Light infantry tactics were characterised by open order formations, which demanded a 
greater individual discipline of the soldier and in turn demanded a greater attention of the 
commanding officer to maintain control on the overall cohesion and thereby the combat 
effectiveness. The successful execution of light as well as line infantry tactics required regular 
drill training coupled with combat experience; the nineteenth-century infantry tactics adopted by 
the American Board of Tactics were therefore most appropriate for the professional regular 
army.    
At the outbreak of the Civil War, irregular troops in the Union and Confederate armies 
outnumbered the core of regular troops. The professional knowledge and experience dissipated 
in the irregular masses on the lower levels of command, but persisted in the higher levels. In the 
first battle of Bull Run on 21 July 1861, the Union and Confederate commanders not only 
struggled with their adversaries, but also struggled to maintain order and control of their own 
troops.  
The Union commander at Bull Run, Brig. Gen. McDowell devised his battle plan around 
a single flanking manoeuvre against the Confederate left. Not necessarily unfeasible and primarily 
centred on ‘Jominian’ principles, McDowell’s plan was to concentrate his Union forces at the 
weakest point of the fortified Confederate line, which was the exposed left flank. In order for his 
plan to succeed, the mostly inexperienced Union soldiers would have to perform some 
considerable tactical manoeuvres, but that did not stop McDowell from taking them to battle. 
At Bull Run, the Confederates responded quickly to the Union flanking manoeuvre and 
repositioned themselves on Matthews Hill. After their withdrawal from Matthews Hill, 
Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston predicted that the battle would be decided on Henry 
House Hill. While both sides suffered from the lack of regular soldiers and officers, the irregular 
troops were more manageable on the tactical defensive. The Confederate commanders at Bull 
Run were not forced to perform large tactical manoeuvres, while McDowell’s strategic objective 
was to take quick and decisive action against the Rebels. This made tactical manoeuvring 
inevitable. 
At the Battle of Antietam, Confederate General Robert E. Lee was forced on the tactical 
defensive and faced a numerical superior force, but did not order to build field fortifications. 
Again the Union commander, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan devised a battle plan around two 
fronts; Union forces would stage an attack against the Confederate right, while McClellan’s main 
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force would engage the Confederate centre and left. Compared to Bull Run, both Union and 
Confederate soldiers endured heavy losses, but with few exceptions, the soldiers fought 
relentlessly and were no longer as easily panicked. The Union troops penetrated the Confederate 
defensive positions around Sharpsburg, but their commander failed to coordinate the attack 
waves accordingly, leaving them behind enemy lines without support. This major tactical flaw in 
the execution of McClellan’s battle plan was fully exploited by Lee, who awaited the arrival of his 
reinforcements from Harpers Ferry and defeated the Union forces one by one in counterattacks. 
 During the battle of Gettysburg, the tactical importance of occupying crucial high 
grounds went hand in hand with the ability of Union Maj. Gen. George G. Meade to manoeuvre 
his forces around to reinforce sectors under threat of Confederate attacks. The battle was not 
lost on the first day, but as Meade closed the gaps in his defensive line on the second day, and he 
correctly predicted Lee’s plan of attack on the third day, a Confederate defeat was almost certain. 
Lee had failed to secure crucial high grounds on the first and second day and was now left with 
facing a strong reinforced defensive line. While Lee could have decided to withdraw, his strategic 
objective was to deliver a decisive victory on Northern territory, which forced him to order a 
final massed frontal assault. 
After Gettysburg, the Union commander Ulysses S. Grant was determined to capture the 
Confederate capital of Richmond and engage Lee’s forces wherever he could. Lee’s objective was 
to hold off the Army of the Potomac as long as possible and therefore he increasingly relied on 
strong fortified positions. After the inconclusive battle in the Wilderness, Grant intended to 
manoeuvre around Lee to position himself between Lee’s forces and the Confederate capital. 
However, Lee perceived Grant’s plan and managed to position himself first near the 
Spotsylvania crossroads. Lee occupied strong defensive positions and while Grant at first 
attempted to manoeuvre around, he decided that a massed frontal assault was necessary to 
destroy Lee’s positions and force him out of the woods.  
 
Over the course of the four battles there is indeed an increased use of field fortifications, which 
were primarily of tactical importance during the battles of Gettysburg and Spotsylvania. Still, this 
does not justify the claim of a conscious shift towards the tactical defensive in response to the 
increased firepower of the rifled-musket.  
Whether the tactical defensive was superior to the tactical offensive remains a different 
question. In all four battles, the attackers hardly adjusted their offensive tactics, despite the 
increased use of field fortifications by the defenders at Gettysburg and Spotsylvania. Lee as well 
as Grant still ordered massed frontal assaults against strong defensive positions. At Antietam, 
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Lee was strategically on the offensive and tactically on the defensive, but did not order the 
construction of field fortifications at Antietam. However, Lee’s troops did utilise the artificial 
cover provided by the terrain, such as stonewalls or a sunken road. So in general, if the terrain 
would not provide sufficient artificial cover, Civil War commanders felt compelled to employ 
field fortifications on the tactical defensive.  
Besides protection against the increased firepower, artificial cover had a far more 
valuable purpose for the Civil War commander as they could occupy more ground with fewer 
men, effectively denying the enemy room for manoeuvre and access to crucial high grounds. 
Meade at Gettysburg and Lee at Spotsylvania employed field fortifications which prohibited their 
adversaries from tactical manoeuvres, forcing them to withdraw or ordering massed frontal 
assaults. Still, Civil War commanders could not solely rely on their defensive positions. The early 
nineteenth century tactical virtues of manoeuvres and concentration of force had persevered, so 
defenders had to maintain a level of mobility to reinforce or counterattack along the defensive 
line. 
The massed frontal assaults during the American Civil War were characterised by a high 
loss of life on the side of the attacker. In this regard, field fortifications were tactically superior to 
the massed frontal assault. This tactical advantage could have been mitigated if attacking 
commanders would not have neglected the use of more complex assault tactics (like successive 
advances by small attack columns), which were already advocated before the Civil War by 
European and American military theorists. The superiority of the tactical defensive was therefore 
rather superficial as small attack columns had proven to be successful against fortified defensive 
positions. This was despite the increased firepower of the rifled-musket.  
The American Civil War was, in terms of infantry tactics, a transitional war where 
offensive tactics witnessed in the Napoleonic Wars clashed with the increased use of field 
fortifications advocated by American military theorists, notably Mahan and Halleck in the 1830s 
and 1840s. The firepower of the rifled-musket was not yet significant enough to force both 
attackers and defenders in prolonged trench warfare. 
The elements most decisive for the modus operandi of the American officers on the 
battlefield were their strategic objectives and the capability of their troops to achieve these 
objectives on the tactical level. The commanding officers on both sides showed a firm belief in 
the decisive battle to achieve their strategic objectives. This belief had compelled McDowell at 
Bull Run, Lee at Antietam and Gettysburg and Grant at Spotsylvania to engage and set aside any 
possible tactical disadvantages, such as an inexperienced irregular army, inferior numbers or 
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strong defensive positions. At Antietam, McClellan disengaged from battle, convinced that he 
could not achieve a decisive victory against Lee’s forces. 
The tactical offensive in the Civil War was defined by early nineteenth century infantry 
tactics and the successful execution of these tactics in the Mexican-American War. This, 
combined with the firm belief of Civil War commanders in decisive battles. Therefore senior 
commanders ordered the massed frontal assault when tactical manoeuvres had failed to force a 
breakthrough, whether theory and experience taught them or not. The tactical defensive was 
defined by the advocacy of field fortifications prior to the Civil War and the proven tactical value 
of field fortifications to limit the manoeuvrability of the attacker during the Civil War. 
Still, the American Civil War challenged the unrestrained use of massed frontal assaults, 
because of the increased firepower of the rifled musket and the increased use of the shovel. 
Edward Hagerman would characterise the Civil War as the first modern war, and while this 
could be considered a bolt statement, based on the findings of this thesis I must agree. In all four 
battles, reviewed in this thesis, the tactical superiority of the defensive position is clear. Massed 
frontal assaults or grand flanking manoeuvres were no longer guarantees for victory. While the 
defenders were still forced to maintain a certain level of mobility; troop movements were more 
easily intercepted, undoubtedly in part by the increased firepower of the rifled musket.  
Towards the end of the Civil War it was no longer self-evident, as Grant demonstrated at 
Spotsylvania Courthouse, to order a massed frontal assault against a smaller force in a fortified 
defensive position, before exploring other tactical solutions such as more complex assault tactics 
or evading the static fortified positions. However, if the defending commanders reacted 
accordingly by extending their fortified line of defence, as Meade did at Gettysburg and Lee did 
at Spotsylvania, the attacking commanders were forced to order a massed frontal assault or settle 
for an exchange of fire from trenches.  
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Appendix 
Map 1: First Battle of Bull Run – Situation July 18, 1861. 
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Map 2: First Battle of Bull Run – Situation morning July 21, 1861. 
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Map 4: First Battle of Bull Run – Actions 4 p.m.-dusk July 21, 1861. 
 
Map 3: First Battle of Bull Run – Actions 1-3 p.m. July 21, 1861. 
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Map 5: Battle of Antietam – Overview September 17, 1862. 
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Map 7: Battle of Antietam – 7:30 a.m. September 17, 1862. 
 
 
Map 6: Battle of Antietam – 6 a.m. September 17, 1862. 
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Map 9: Battle of Antietam – 10 a.m. September 17, 1862. 
 
 
Map 8: Battle of Antietam – 9 a.m. September 17, 1862. 
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Map 10: Battle of Gettysburg – Overview July 1, 1863. 
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Map 11: Battle of Gettysburg – Lee’s plan for July 2, 1863. 
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Map 12: Battle of Gettysburg – Overview July2, 1863. 
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Map 13: Battle of Gettysburg – Pickett’s Charge July 3, 1863. 
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Map 14: Battle of Spotsylvania Court House – Movements May 7-8, 1864. 
 
 
Map 15: Battle of Spotsylvania Court House – Situation 4 pm May 9, 1864. 
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Map 16: Battle of Spotsylvania Court House – Actions May 10, 1864. 
 
 
Map 17: Battle of Spotsylvania Court House – Actions May 12, 1864. 
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Map 18: Battle of Spotsylvania Court House – Movements May 13-14, 1864. 
 
 
Map 19: Battle of Spotsylvania Court House – Actions May 17-18, 1864. 
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